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Overheard at a Catskills Resort 
(one guest to another): 
-The  food is so terrible here. 
-Yes.  And the portions are so small. 
13.1  Introduction 
Patents and patent statistics have fascinated economists for a long time. 
Questions about sources of economic growth, the rate of technological change, 
the competitive position of different firms and countries, the dynamism of al- 
ternative industrial structures and arrangements all tend to revolve around no- 
tions of differential inventiveness: What has happened to the “underlying” rate 
of technical and scientific progress? How has it changed over time and across 
industries and national boundaries? We have, in fact, almost no good measures 
on any of this and are thus reduced to pure speculation or to the use of various, 
only distantly related, “residual” measures and other proxies. In this desert of 
data, patent statistics loom up as a mirage of wonderful plentitude and objectiv- 
ity. They are available; they are by definition related to inventiveness, and they 
are based on what appears to be an objective and only slowly changing stan- 
dard. No wonder that the idea that something interesting might be learned from 
such data tends to be rediscovered in each generation. 
I shall try, in this survey, to show why I think patent statistics are interesting 
in spite of all the difficulties that arise in their use and interpretation. To do so 
I shall first describe the nature of patents and the types of data generated by 
their issuance, their current availability, and some of the major problems that 
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arise when one tries to use them in economic analysis. I shall next review 
briefly some of the earlier work on this range of issues, focusing particularly 
on Jacob Schmookler’s work and the questions raised by  it. This will be fol- 
lowed by a review of the more modern, “computer age” work of the NBER 
group (Griliches, Hall, Hausman, Jaffe, Pakes, Schankerman and others), and 
I shall allude also to similar work of others, especially that of Scherer and the 
Yale group (Levin, Nelson, Klevorick, Winter, Reiss, Cohen, and others), and 
the SPRU group (Freeman, Pavitt, Soete, and others). I will not be able to do 
justice to all of this work (the work of  others, of my collaborators, and even 
my own) but I hope to put up enough guideposts so that the interested reader 
can find his own way to and through this literature.’ 
Over all this work hovers the question, “What can one use patent statistics 
for?’ Can one use them to interpret longer-tern trends? If so, did inventiveness 
really decline in the 1930s and early 1940s, as indicated by such statistics, and 
again in the mid-l970s? Does the fact that large firms have a lower patents per 
RSrD dollar ratio imply diminishing returns to such investments? Can one use 
such numbers to conclude that demand forces are stronger determining factors 
in the evolution of technological progress than supply factors, than the evolu- 
tion of science, as Schmookler could be interpreted to say? These are the type 
of substantive questions that I will explore, though not necessarily answer, in 
this survey. 
There is much that will not be covered in this survey. I will not discuss the 
literature that deals with the social value of the patent system and with alterna- 
tive lengths of protection and licensing arrangements. Nor will I deal with the 
recent and rapidly growing theoretical literature on “patent races” and related 
game-theoretical topics. One has to draw the line somewhere and the task out- 
lined above may be already too large for one article and one person to deal 
with. Nor will this be a fully “balanced” survey. I shall, perforce, concentrate 
more on topics that I and my research associates have found most interesting, 
slighting thereby, sometimes unwittingly, some of the work of others in this 
field.2 
13.2  Patents and Patent Statistics 
A patent is a document, issued by an authorized governmental agency, grant- 
ing the right to exclude anyone else from the production or use of a specific 
new device, apparatus, or process for a stated number of years (17 in the U.S. 
currently). The grant is issued to the inventor of this device or process after an 
examination that focuses on both the novelty of the claimed item and its poten- 
1. There are several other good surveys on this range of topics. See especially B. L. Basberg 
(1987), Keith Pavitt (1978, 1985). Pakes and M. Simpson (1989), Mark Schankerman (1989), and 
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tial utility. The right embedded in the patent can be assigned by  the inventor to 
somebody else, usually to his employer, a corporation, and/or sold to or li- 
censed for use by somebody else. This right can be enforced only by the poten- 
tial threat of  or an actual suit in the courts for infringement damages. The 
stated purpose of  the patent system is to encourage invention and technical 
progress both by providing a temporary monopoly for the inventor and by forc- 
ing the early disclosure of the information necessary for the production of this 
item or the operation of the new process. 
The standard of novelty and utility imposed on the granting of such a right 
is not very high. (In this it probably does not differ greatly from the standards 
imposed in most fields on the publication of scientific journal articles.) In the 
U.S., for example, about 104,000 applications were filed in 1980 for (“utility”) 
patents, of which about 65,000 were granted by  the end of  1984; 1,400 more 
were granted by  the end of  1988, with another 300 or so to follow over the 
next three to five years. These numbers are typical. In the U.S. the granting 
success rate fluctuated around 65 percent in the 1970s. Roughly speaking, two 
out of  three applications are eventually granted. The granting rate, the strin- 
gency of examination, varies greatly across countries and also somewhat over 
time. It has been over 90 percent in France (until the mid-1970s), about 80 
percent in the U.K., and only 35 percent in Germany (Schankerman and Pakes 
1986, Table 1), and has varied in the U.S. from a low of 58 percent in 1965 to 
a high of  72 percent in  1967 (of  domestic applications between  1965 and 
1980). This variability is, as I will show later, largely associated with differ- 
ences in the procedures and resources of the various patent offices, implying, 
therefore, also differences in the average “quality” of a granted patent across 
countries and periods. 
Of the approximately 62,000 patents granted in 1980, 24,000 or 39 percent 
were granted to foreign inventors, a ratio that has been rising sharply over the 
last decades, from 19 percent in the early 1960s to 48 percent in 1988. U.S. 
corporations have accounted for about 73 percent of the total patents granted 
to U.S. inventors (in  1988), with 2 percent being granted to agencies of  the 
U.S. government, and the rest, 25 percent, going to individual inventors. The 
fraction accounted for by foreign corporations of total foreign patenting in the 
U.S. has risen from 64 percent in the mid-1960s to 82 percent in  1988. The 
general trends in such numbers are depicted in Figures 13.1 and 13.2. 
Even though grants can be thought of as a moving average of past applica- 
tions, it can be seen in these figures that they tend to fluctuate as much or more 
than the number of patents applied for. It is also clear that economic conditions 
impinge on the rate of which patents are applied for. Applications were lower 
during the Great Depression and also during World War 11,  and their growth 
was  retarded in the 1970s. Moreover, patents assigned to U.S. corporations 
have not grown at anywhere near the rate of growth of total R&D expenditures 
in industry (and hence even less than the rate of growth in company-financed 








Fig. 13.1  U.S. patent applications and grants, 1880-1989,  in thousands 
Sources: National Science Board (1987); U.S. Patent and nademark Office (1977, 1989  and sub- 
sequent releases). 
inventive activity, a major aspect of which is also measured by R&D expendi- 
tures, this view will need reconciling with the aggregate facts depicted in Fig- 
ure 13.2. 
Data are also available at the firm level. In 1984 the largest patenters were 
General Electric, IBM, and Hitachi with 785, 608, and 596 patents granted 
respectively. Most of the major US.  patenting firms experienced a declining 
trend in patents granted during the 1970s with some recovery in the 1980s, 
while there has been a rapid growth in U.S. patents granted to the major Japa- 
nese electronics and motor vehicles firms (see Griliches 1989, Figure 5). 
What I have done in the preceding paragraphs is to discuss the information 
implicit in patent counts, in the number of patents issued at different times, 
in different countries, and to different types of inventors. This is the type of 
information that economists have largely focused on, also cross-classifying it 
by  industry and firm, and it is the use of such numbers in economic analysis 
that will be the main topic of  this survey. But a patent document, which is 
public after it has been granted, contains much more information than that. 
Besides information on the names of  inventors and their addresses and the 
name of the organization to which the patent right may have been assigned, it 
also lists one or more patent classes to which it has been assigned by the exam- 291  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
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Fig. 13.2  U.S. domestic patents and R&D, 1953-89, log scale 
Note:  Domestic corporations: estimated applications-U.S.  corporate grants by date applied for, 
inflated by  U0.65,  the average success rate. 
iners, cites a number of previous patents and sometimes also scientific articles 
to which this particular invention may be related, and also finally, but from the 
social point of view most important, provides a reasonably complete descrip- 
tion of  the invention covered by  this particular patent. Thus, there is much 
more information derivable from the patent documents than just simply their 
aggregated number in a particular year or for a particular firm. One can study 
the geographic distribution of particular inventions, one can investigate citation 
networks and patterns, and one can actually read the detailed text of a series 
of patents in a particular field as raw material for an economic-technological 
history of it. Also, in a number of foreign countries, and in the U.S. since 1982, 
a non-negligible renewal fee, which rises with the age of the patent, has to be 
paid. This results in a significant abandonment of patents before their statutory 
expiration date and generates, in passing, a set of potentially very interesting 
patent mortality statistics. 
In the U.S., aggregate patent statistics classified in a variety of  ways  are 
released by the Office of Documentation (formerly the Office of Technology 
Assessment and Forecast) at the U.S. Patent Office. Major series are published 
in the National  Science Foundation’s biannual Science Indicators compen- 
dium. More detailed tabulations are available from or can be prepared by the 292  Chapter 13 
Patent Office and summary information on all recent patents is now also avail- 
able on CD-ROM disks. The full text of the patents can be found in a number 
of depository libraries in the U.S. and now can also be accessed via several 
bibliographic computerized data base services, such as Dialog and BSR. Given 
the advanced search software available on these services it is possible to con- 
duct a variety of  specific searches of such data bases, looking for patents in a 
particular area or those mentioning a particular material, instrument, or a spe- 
cific earlier patent, and tabulate the results at a reasonable cost. Patent data for 
other countries are being collected by the International Patent Documentation 
Center in Vienna, Austria, and published annually in World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Annual. Country summaries are published in OECD, Main Science and 
Technology  Indicators, and by various country statistical offices, such as Statis- 
tics Canada. Current information on individual foreign patents is available on 
line from Dialog. 
There are two major problems in using patents for economic analysis: classi- 
fication and intrinsic variability. The first is primarily a technical problem. How 
does one allocate patent data  organized by  firms or  by  substantive patent 
classes into economically relevant industry or  product groupings? I shall dis- 
cuss this question shortly. The second problem is fundamentally much harder 
and will be discussed at some length below. It refers to the obvious fact that 
patents differ greatly in their technical and economic significance. Many of 
them reflect minor improvements  of little economic value. Some of them, how- 
ever,  prove  extremely valuable. Unfortunately, we  rarely  know  which  are 
which and do not yet have a good procedure for “weighting” them appropri- 
ately. I shall discuss the available scraps of evidence on this topic in Section 
13.5 of this survey. 
Patents are awarded for an invention of  a chemical formula, a mechanical 
device, or a process (procedure), and now even a computer program. The Pa- 
tent Office classifies patents into many classes (300+ in the mid-1950s) and 
even many more subclasses (over 50,000),  based on its need to ease the search 
for prior art. The resulting classification system is based primarily on techno- 
logical and functional principles and is only rarely related to economists’ no- 
tions of products or well-defined industries (which may be a mirage anyway). 
A subclass dealing with the dispensing of liquids contains both a patent for a 
water pistol and one for a holy water dispenser. Another subclass relating to 
the dispensing of solids contains patents on both manure spreaders and tooth- 
paste tubes (Schmookler 1966, p. 20). Nevertheless, with one notable excep- 
tion (Scherer 1984a) and the more recent Canadian data-based studies, almost 
all attempts to relate patent numbers to industrial data use the subclass system 
as their basic unit of assignment. 
Before any classification is attempted one has to face the inherent ambiguity 
of the task. Do we want to assign the invention to the industry in which it was 
made (“origin”), to the industry that is likely to produce it, or to the industry 293  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
that will use the resulting product or process and whose productivity may bene- 
fit thereby (destination or industry of “use”)? Consider, as an example, the case 
of  a new plow invented in a chemical firm’s research laboratory as part of  its 
project on new combined fertilizer and tillage systems. It depends on what 
question is to be asked of  the data. If  we want to study the returns to R&D 
expenditures we  may  wish to count it in the chemical industry whence the 
money came to develop it. If we want to analyze the impact of technological 
change on the rate of investment, on the sale of new equipment, we may wish 
to count it in the farm equipment industry. If  we are interested in its effects 
on measured productivity we are more likely to count it as being relevant to 
agriculture. This difference in questions reflects itself also in different classi- 
fication strategies pursued by different researchers. 
Schmookler, in his main work, chose to construct data on capital goods pa- 
tents relevant to a particular industry by reviewing carefully a set of subclasses, 
sampling a number of  patents in them, and deciding whether most of  them 
were indeed likely to be used in the industry in question. He then aggregated 
the total number of patents in each of the accepted subclasses into an industry- 
wide total. In this way he constructed time series for capital goods inventions 
of  relevance for the railroad industry, the paper-making industry, petroleum 
refining, and building construction. By  focusing on capital goods inventions 
only and on a few selected and better-defined industries, and by not insisting 
on completeness or inclusivity, he made life quite a bit easier for himself. This 
choice forced him, however, to forgo any serious analysis of the patenting of 
consumer goods or manufacturing processes. His industrial classification was 
based on the third type: the locus of  potential use for the new or improved 
capital good. 
In the mid-1970s the Patent Office established a research unit, the Office of 
Technology Assessment and Forecast (OTAF). One of its first jobs, on a con- 
tract from the Science Indicators Unit  of  the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), was to try to produce patent statistics at the three- and two-and-a-half- 
digit standard industrial classification (SIC) levels corresponding roughly to 
the NSF’s classification of applied research and development by  product field. 
This was done by  developing a “concordance” between the patent class and 
subclass classification and the SIC. Where a subclass did not obviously belong 
in a single SIC industry, it was counted in all of the relevant ones, resulting in 
significant double counting. The industrial allocation was based primarily on 
the second notion of  the relevant industrial classification: Patents were allo- 
cated to the industries that were expected to produce the products designed by 
them or to use the new processes in the manufacture of  their products. The 
new plow patent, in the previous example, would be assigned by  the OTAF 
concordance to the farm equipment manufacturing industry. 
The OTAF concordance was criticized early on because of both the arbitrari- 
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that could arise from the pervasive double counting (F. M. Scherer 1982a; Luc 
Soete 1983).3  One of  the two most glaring examples of  problems raised by 
such procedures was the appearance of significant and fast-growing patenting 
by the Japanese in the aircraft industry, a rather surprising and mysterious de- 
velopment given the rather rudimentary state of the Japanese aircraft industry 
at that time. It turned out to be the result of  allocating the “engines” patents 
category to both motor vehicles and aircraft. Almost all of the Japanese engine 
patents were automobile engine patents and because patenting in the engine 
category was high relative to other kinds of aircraft patents, it came to domi- 
nate the aircraft patents category almost entirely. The other example was pro- 
vided by  the agricultural chemicals and drug industries where the assigned 
patents overlapped at the rate of 90 percent (!). That is, only 10 percent of the 
patents counted in those industries were unique to them. It is doubtful whether 
such heavily overlapping data can be used in economic analyses that try to 
learn something about sources of  technical progress by  examining the con- 
trasting experiences of different industries. The OTAF “industry” data contains 
too little independent information on the patenting history of actual industries. 
As a result of such criticisms, the 1985 version of this concordance has been 
improved by correcting some of the more obvious errors and by fractionalizing 
the allocation of dubious subclasses, reducing thereby their overall importance 
in the final totals. But most of the basic questions of classification still remain 
to be answered. 
One way to get around some of these problems is to have the patent examiner 
assign the individual patent to one or several SIC industries, based on potential 
use. This is now being done in the Canadian patent system. One possibility, 
currently being pursued by Robert Evenson and his students, is to take a sam- 
ple of U.S. patents also patented in Canada and to cross-tabulate the Canadian 
SIC assignments against the U.S.  patent classification system, deriving thereby 
an empirically based and already naturally fractionalized alternative concor- 
dance (see annex A of A. S. Englander, R. Evenson, and M. Hanazaki 1988; 
Evenson, S. Kortum, and J. Putnam 1988; Kortum and Putnam 1989). 
An  alternative approach, first pursued by  Scherer (1965a and 1965b) and 
more currently by the NBER group (see John Bound et al. 1984), starts from 
patent totals for particular firms and then groups them into industries according 
to the firm’s primary activity. This is an “origin” classification. It may be useful 
for the analysis of firm level data, relating patents to R&D investments and the 
subsequent fortunes of  the firms where they had been originally developed. 
But it is much less useful for the analysis of industrial data, both because of 
the conglomerateness of many of the large U.S. corporations and because par- 
ticular patents may  be having an  impact far beyond the boundaries of  their 
industry of “origin.” 
3. See OTAF 1985, the proceedings of the conference on the concordance, for a more detailed 
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The extensive diversification of  many firms and  also the various merger 
waves create severe technical problems in trying to use the patent data even at 
the individual corporation level. What is noted on the patent is the name of the 
organization to which it has been assigned. This organization can easily be a 
subsidiary or a separate division of  a larger company. Moreover, a company 
may change its name and/or may  merge. Because the patent office does not 
employ a consistent company code in its computer record, except for the “top 
patenting companies” where the list of subsidiaries is checked manually, the 
company patenting numbers produced by a simple aggregation of its computer 
records can be seriously incomplete (see B. H. Hall et al. 1988 for additional 
detail on this range of issues). 
Because of  such considerations and because he was interested in tracing 
through the spillover effects of  R&D on productivity in industries that were 
most likely to benefit from them, Scherer (1982b, 1984a) undertook the large 
task of examining over 15,000 patents awarded from June 1976 through March 
1977 to the 443 largest U.S. manufacturing corporations represented in the 
Federal Trade Commission Lines of Business survey in 1974. There are at least 
two unique aspects to this data construction effort: First, each patent was exam- 
ined individually, classified as to product or process invention, and assigned to 
up to three potential industries of “use” or two possible general use categories. 
In addition, the patent was also assigned to an industry of “origin” on the basis 
of the information on the location of the inventors within the Lines of Business 
structure of the particular company. That is, and this is the second unique as- 
pect of  these data, the industry of  origin was defined “below” the company 
level, at the more relevant “business” or divisional level, and the R&D expen- 
ditures of the companies were similarly subdivided and matched at this more 
appropriate industrial level. One of the final products of this work was a “tech- 
nology flow” matrix, using the resulting cross-classification of patents by  in- 
dustry of  origin and industry of  use to “link” the industries in which R&D 
expenditures have been incurred to industries whose productivity growth may 
reflect  the  fruits  of  such  expenditures. (Such a  matrix was  suggested by 
Schmookler 1966, p. 167.) Unfortunately, this large, one-time data construc- 
tion effort does not really have a time-series dimension to it. Moreover, the 
FTC discontinued collecting data at the Lines of Business level in 1979, mak- 
ing it less likely that it could be replicated in the future. 
A less ambitious but somewhat more extensive data construction effort was 
pursued by the NBER group (see Bound et al. 1984; Griliches, Pakes, and Hall 
1987; and Hall et al. 1988), who tried to match the patent office data on patents 
issued to all organizations from 1969 through 1982 with income and balance 
sheet and stock market value data for all publicly traded manufacturing corpo- 
rations, defined as of  1976, and also create a consistent historical record for 
them for the period  1959-81.  The resulting data sets consisted of  a cross- 
section of about 2,600 firms in 1976 (with over 1,700 firms receiving at least 
one patent between  1969 and  1979, about  1,000 firms applying for at least 296  Chapter 13 
one, ultimately granted, patent in 1976, and about 1,500 firms reporting R&D 
expenditures in 1976) and a panel of about 1,000 to 1,800 firms with detailed 
data between 1963 and 1981, with a subset of about 700 firms reporting consis- 
tent R&D data between 1972 and 1980. These data sets formed the basis for a 
number of studies that will be discussed below. 
13.3  Patents as Indicators of What? 
There are two ways of asking this question: What aspects of economic activ- 
ity do patent statistics actually capture? And, what would we like them to mea- 
sure? Ultimately, only the first question is of relevance but it is useful to spend 
some time on the second, because it provides some understanding of  the re- 
search in this field. 
Roughly speaking, we would like to measure and understand better the eco- 
nomic processes that lead to the reduction in the cost of  producing existing 
products and the development of new products and services. We  would like to 
measure both the inputs and the outputs of such processes, to understand what 
determines the allocation of resources to such “technology changing” activi- 
ties, and also what is happening and why to the efficiency with which they are 
pursued in different times and in different places. Assuming that different new 
products can be brought to a common denominator through the use of some 
meta-hedonic function, one can think of invention as shifting outward the pro- 
duction possibilities frontier for some generalized aggregate of potential hu- 
man wants. Ideally, we might hope that patent statistics would provide a mea- 
sure of  the output of  such an activity, a direct reading on the rate at which 
the potential production possibilities frontier is shifting outward. The reality, 
however, is very far from it. 
The dream of getting hold of an output indicator of inventive activity is one 
of the strong motivating forces for economic research in this area. After all, a 
patent does represent a minimal quantum of invention that has passed both the 
scrutiny of the patent office as to its novelty and the test of the investment of 
effort and resources by the inventor and his organization into the development 
of  this product or idea, indicating thereby the presence of  a non-negligible 
expectation as to its ultimate utility and marketability. One recognizes, of 
course, the presence of a whole host of problems: Not all inventions are patent- 
able, not all inventions are patented, and the inventions that are patented differ 
greatly in “quality,” in the magnitude of inventive output associated with them. 
The first two problems, one thinks, can be taken care of  by  industry dummy 
variables, or by limiting the analysis to a particular sector or industry. For the 
third, one tries to invoke the help of  the “law of  large numbers”: “The eco- 
nomic . .  . significance of any sampled patent can also be interpreted as a ran- 
dom variable with some probability distribution” (Scherer 1965b, p.  1098). 
The question whether our samples are large enough, given the underlying het- 
erogeneity in what is measured by a patent, is a topic to which I shall return 
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It is interesting to note that Schmookler started out thinking that he could 
use patent statistics as an index of inventive output and as an explanation of 
the growth in the aggregate efficiency of the U.S. economy. Schmookler was 
the first, as far as I can tell, to publish numbers on aggregate “total factor 
productivity growth” (Schmookler 1952) (though he never seemed to have 
claimed  much  originality  for  it),  and  to  relate  them  to  patent  statistics 
(Schmookler  195  1). Unfortunately,  the  relationship  did  not  work.  There 
seemed to be little correlation between aggregate total factor productivity and 
total patenting numbers. Schmookler did not give up on patent statistics but 
ultimately redefined what he thought they could do. In his hands patents be- 
came an index of inventive “activity,” primarily an input rather than an output 
index. 
He moved, essentially, in the direction of  what patents can measure rather 
than what we would want them to measure. His interpretation of inventive ac- 
tivity became quite narrow. It excluded research, which he interpreted as a 
search for new knowledge, an attempt to discover new properties of classes of 
objects or processes, and it also excluded development, which is largely the 
development and refinement of already made inventions (even though quite a 
few patents are likely to be generated also during this phase). Inventive activity 
per se is “work specifically directed towards the formulation of the essential 
properties of a novel product or process” (Schmookler 1966, p. 8). This is an 
“input” definition, to be thought of  as computable in man-hour equivalents, 
and corresponds to only a very thin slice, both quantitatively and in the time 
dimension, of what is usually covered by the notion of R&D and the associated 
R&D statistics. 
One should keep in mind, however, the historical context of  most of  the 
earlier work on patents. There were no R&D expenditure statistics of any gen- 
erality before the late 1950s and only scattered numbers on scientists employed 
in  different industrial laboratories or on the distribution of  the technically 
trained labor force (see David Mowery 1983).  Thus, an indicator of input was 
also valuable. There was almost no substitute for it. Even today, with data much 
more plentiful, the available detail in the published R&D statistics is still quite 
limited. Thus, as I shall argue below, showing that patent statistics are a good 
indicator of  inputs into inventive activity is a useful accomplishment on its 
own merit. It allows us an insight into what is going on in more areas and also 
in much more detail than is possible to glimpse from the available R&D sta- 
tistics. 
How does one come to know whether patent statistics measure anything 
interesting? Input or output? One way is to look for correlations between patent 
counts and other variables that are thought to matter: input measures such as 
R&D expenditures, and output measures such as productivity growth, profit- 
ability, or the stock market value of the firm. It is useful, therefore, to introduce 
here a figure (Figure 13.3)  from Pakes and Griliches (1984) which essentially 
restates the previous sentence in graphic terms and allows a more detailed dis- 
cussion of its underlying assumptions. Fig. 13.3  Knowledge production function: a simplified path analysis diagram 
Source: Pakes and Griliches (1984), figure 3.1. 
Notes: R = research expenditures. 
K = additions to economically valuable knowledge. 
P = patents, a quantitative indicator of the number of inventions. 
Z's  = indicators of expected or realized benefits from invention. 
X's  = other observed variables influencing the Z's. 
u, v = other unobserved influences, assumed random and mutually uncorrelated. 299  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
In the center of Figure 13.3 is an unobservable variable, K,  the net accretion 
of economically valuable knowledge. This is the variable that we would like 
to measure. It is the measure of “inventive output” which one would hope that 
patents would be a good indicator of. The diagram indicates that and adds an 
error v to the determinants of  patenting, making them an imperfect, fallible 
measure of K.  The causal part of  this diagram starts in the lower right-hand 
comer with some observable measure of resources invested in inventive activ- 
ity (R),  usually R&D expenditures, or the number of research scientists, which 
are directed at the production of K.  Because knowledge production is stochas- 
tic, the u term is added to reflect its changing efficiency and the impact of other 
informal and unmeasured sources of  K.  The variables that we are ultimately 
interested in explaining are represented by the Z‘s. These could be various mea- 
sures of growth, productivity, profitability, or the stock market value of a firm 
or industry. They are all affected by the unobservable K,  by other measurable 
variables X,  and by additional random components, the e’s. 
A number of extreme simplifications were made in drawing this figure and 
in defining the various terms. For example, the relationship between K  and K 
should be defined explicitly to allow for the possibility of decay in the private 
value of knowledge. Also, R is taken as exogenous. If, as is likely, the u’s are 
correlated over time, then one might expect them to feed back into R in subse- 
quent periods. Nor do patents play an explicit economic role here. They are 
just an indicator of k.  The assumption being made is that some random fraction 
of K gets patented. It is a statistical descriptive model rather than a “theory” 
of patenting. A “theory” would have to be more explicit about the conditions 
(economic, technological, and legal) under which the benefits from applying 
for a patent outweigh the direct costs of application and the potential conse- 
quences of  disclosing the technology. This would add more structure to the 
relationship between P and K. 
Such a theory would start with the underlying notion of a research project 
whose success depends stochastically on both the amount of resources devoted 
to it and the amount of  time that such resources have been deployed. Each 
technical success is associated with an expectation of the ultimate economic 
value of a patent to the inventor or the employer. If this expectation exceeds a 
certain minimum, the cost of patenting, a patent will be applied for. That is, the 
number of patents applied for is a count of the number of successful projects 
(inventions) with the economic value of the patent right exceeding a minimal 
threshold level. If the distribution of the expected value of patenting successful 
projects remains stable, and if the level of current and past R&D expenditures 
shifts the probability that projects will be technically successful, an increase in 
the number of patents can be taken as an indicator of an upward shift in the 
distribution of K.  Whether the relationship is proportional will depend on the 
shape of the assumed distributions and the nature of the underlying shifts in 
them. What is depicted in Figure 13.3 is at best a very crude reduced-form- 300  Chapter 13 
type relation whose theoretical underpinnings have still to be worked out. But 
one has to start ~omeplace.~ 
There are also ambiguities in the definition of K and K.  Are we talking about 
private or social returns to knowledge? That depends on the Zs  available to us 
and the question we are particularly interested in answering. For an analysis of 
productivity movements at the level of industries, it is the social value that we 
care about. For an analysis of the stock market value of different firms, only 
the private value version makes any sense. One may also wish to distinguish 
between the value of patent rights and the economic value of a particular pa- 
tent. It is the latter notion that we might be interested in, though it is the former 
that is likely to show up in survey responses of patentors or be implicit in the 
decision whether to pay a fee and renew a particular patent. Nevertheless, Fig- 
ure 13.3 does provide a schema for discussing much of the research in this area 
and in particular the question of the “quality” of patent counts as indicators of 
economically valuable knowledge. 
There are several different ways of rephrasing this question: (1) How good 
is P as an indicator of K? (2) If P is an “output” measure and R is an “input” 
measure, are we better off in having one or the other if  we had to, or could, 
make such a choice? (3)  What is the value added of P, above and beyond R,  to 
the explanation of the Zs?  Because K is intrinsically unobservable, the first 
question cannot really be answered without embedding it in some model such 
as is sketched out in this figure. It may be helpful, at this point, to write down 
the simplest possible model that might correspond to this figure: 
K=R+u, 
P  = aK+  v  = aR + au  + v, 
Z  = bK  + e  = bR  + bu  + e, 
where the first equation is the “knowledge production function” with the unob- 
servable K  being measured in units of R; the second equation is the indicator 
function relating P to K; and the third equation represents the influence of K 
on subsequent  variables of  interest. The important  assumption that  will  be 
made here is that the various random components u, v, and e are independent 
of each other. I need not repeat the caveats about the simplicity of this model. 
It is adequate, however, for making the following points: (1) The “quality” of 
P as an indicator of K depends on the size of  v, the error in the indicator rela- 
tionship. If  we take its variance as a measure of its error and we substitute R 
for K in  this relationship,  as in the right-hand  part  of the  second equation 
above, we see that under the assumptions of  the model the “quality”  of the 
4.  Of course, one need not start here. It is a particularly American view, which finds thinking in 
terms of a “production function of knowledge” congenial and useful, and looks for patents to serve 
as a proxy for the “output” of this process. Less “neoclassically” oriented economists would deny 
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relationship between P and R provides a lower bound on the “quality” of P as 
an indicator of K.  That is, var(au + v) >  var(v). This argument suggests look- 
ing at the correlation between P and R and claiming that if K  is the output of 
the R process and P is an indicator of its success then the correlation between 
P and K  would have been even higher, if it could have been measured. This is 
the sense in which the correlation coefficient between P  and R provides a 
downward biased measure of the quality of P as a indi~ator.~  (2)  The compara- 
tive qualities of  P  and R as proxies for K depend on the relative size of the 
variance of  v and u. If  the error of  measurement in P is large relative to the 
stochastic fluctuation in K,  then R may be the better variable even if it does not 
reflect u. (3) If  the stochastic component of K is important and if  P actually 
captures any of it, there should be some value added in P above and beyond R. 
But if the error of measurement in P is large and the samples are small, we 
may not really see it in the regressions results when P is included as an addi- 
tional variable. 
13.4  Patents and R&D 
In the attempt to “validate” patents as an economic indicator, investigators 
have  repeatedly  examined  the  relationship  of  patents  to  R&D  activity. 
Schmookler (1966, ch. 2)  and Scherer (1965a) are leading examples of earlier 
investigations. More recent results can be found in Bound et al. (1984), Hall, 
Griliches, and Hausman (1986), Pakes and Griliches (1984), Scherer (1983), 
and Acs and Audretsch (1989). Several conclusions as well as a number of 
unresolved questions emerge from this work. 
A major conclusion, emphasized by  Pakes and Griliches, is that there is 
quite a strong relationship between R&D and the number of patents received 
at the cross-sectional level, across firms and industries. The median R-square 
is on the order of 0.9, indicating that patents may indeed be a good indicator 
of unobserved inventive output, at least in this dimension. That this relationship 
is not just due to size differences can be seen in Figure 13.4 (taken from Bound 
et al. 1984), which plots both patents and R&D per unit of a firm’s assets. 
The same relationship, though still statistically significant, is much weaker 
in the within-firms time-series dimension. The median R-square here is on the 
order of 0.3 (in contrast to the 0.9 in the cross-sectional dimension). Neverthe- 
less, the evidence is quite strong that when a firm changes its R&D expendi- 
tures, parallel changes occur also in its patent numbers. The relationship is 
5. This conclusion depends on the additive nature of the error in the indicator function. If k 
were to be looked at just as an aggregation of inventive events, each with a potential value of its 
own, drawn independently from some value distribution, and P counted only some fraction of 
such events and was not related to their values (as in the calculations outlined in Section 13.6). 
then the above inequalities would not hold anymore. If, on the other hand, the patenting decision 
itself were a function of the size of the expected gain from the invention, as noted in the text, then 
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Fig. 13.4  Log of patenwassets versus log of R&D assets 
Source: Bound et al. (1984), figure 2.4. 
close to contemporaneous with some lag effects which are small and not well 
estimated (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman 1986). This is consistent with the 
observation that patents tend to be taken out relatively early in the life of  a 
research project. Because the bulk of R&D expenditures are spent on develop- 
ment, most of  the time-series variance in this variable must come from the 
differential success in the further development of existing projects rather than 
from the initiation of new ones.6 The relatively low correlations in the time 
dimension should, therefore, not be all that surprising, but they imply that pa- 
tent numbers are a much poorer indicator of short-term changes in the output 
of inventive activity or the “fecundity” of R&D. 
The question “Are there diminishing returns to R&D?’ hovers over much of 
this work. In the cross-sectional dimension it is related to the “Schumpeterian” 
question whether large firms and large R&D labs are more or less efficient as 
“engines of innovation” (see William Baldwin and John Scott 1987, ch. 3, and 
Cohen and Levin  1989 for more general reviews of this topic). In  the time- 
series dimension one is faced with the declining ratio of patents received per 
R&D dollar spent and the worry that technological and inventive opportunities 
are being exhausted. There is also the question of how one reconciles the sig- 
nificantly larger estimates of the elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D in 
the cross-sectional versus the time-series dimension. 
6. To  the extent that some patents arise in the development stage, they would also be related to 
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At the cross-sectional level the story is relatively simple. Small firms appear 
to be more “efficient,” receiving a larger number of patents per R&D dollar. 
This can be seen most easily in Figure 13.5 (from Bound et al. 1984), which 
plots the patents per R&D ratio as a function of the size of the R&D program. 
It shows both the much higher ratio for small firms and the fact that this rela- 
tionship becomes effectively flat beyond some minimum size. At the larger 
firm level, where antitrust policy might be relevant, there is no strong evidence 
of diminishing returns to the size of the R&D effort. (This is also the conclu- 
sion reached by  Scherer (1983) on the basis of  a different and better set of 
data.) Given the nonlinearity and the noisiness in this relation, the finding of 
“diminishing returns” is quite sensitive to functional form, weighting schemes, 
and the particular point at which the elasticity is evaluated. 
All of this can be seen in Figure 13.6, also taken from Bound et al., which 
plots the original data and the results of fitting various different models to the 
same data. Two  of  the estimation techniques, Poisson  and  nonlinear least 
squares (NLLS) indicate diminishing returns, while the other two techniques, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and negative binomial (NB), imply increasing 
returns. A glance at the figure will make it clear how a differential emphasis 
on parts of the data (large versus small firms and the treatment of zeroes-not 
visible in the figure) could result in such conflicting estimates. Basically there 
is a sharp contrast between smaller and larger firms. For larger firms the rela- 
tionship is close to linear while there is a reasonably large number of  smaller 
firms that exhibit significant patenting while reporting very little R&D. When 
divided into two samples, small (N = 1,015) and large (N = 483), with $2 
million in R&D expenditures as the dividing line, the estimated average elas- 
ticities are 0.44 and  1.04 respectively. The latter number falls to 0.8 (0.1) if 
one allows separately for the zero patents observations. Though this estimate 
of the elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D for the larger firms is still 
“significantly” less than unity at conventional test levels, allowing for the pos- 
sibility that the R&D numbers are themselves subject to error, one cannot re- 
ally reject the hypothesis of  constant returns in this size range, because the 
“reciprocal” regression of  R&D on patents implies increasing returns to or 
decreasing costs of  getting a patent. (The estimated elasticity of  R&D with 
respect to patents is 0.76.) 
The appearance of diminishing returns at the cross-sectional level is due, I 
think, primarily to two effects: selectivity and the differential role of  formal 
R&D and patents for small and large firms. Most of the data sets available to 
us are not based on a random or carefully stratified sample from the relevant 
underlying population. Rather, they are “opportunity” samples, based on other 
criteria. For example, the 1976 cross-section of  Bound et al. is based on all 
manufacturing firms listed on the New York  and American stock exchanges 
and also on the over-the-counter market. But while almost all relevant large 
firms are so listed, only a relatively small number of the smaller firms trade in 
these markets. To be included in (listed on) the market, a small firm has to be Patents per Million 
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in some sense more “successful” than those that are not, more “interesting” to 
the traders. Thus, it is not surprising that it may also hold more patents than 
might be expected, given its size and R&D program. How atypical these small 
firms might be is suggested by  the rarity of  their selection. Table 13.1 shows 
the number of firms by size (employment) in this cross-section and the corre- 
sponding numbers in the relevant population. While about two-thirds of  the 
large manufacturing firms are included, the smaller ones represent less than 1 
percent of  all small firms and are obviously a heavily selected lot. Unfortu- 
nately, we have no information on the firms not in the sample and hence cannot 
make an appropriate sample selectivity adjustment. 
Another source of the difference between small and large firms is in the role 
of formal R&D in them and the differential importance of patents to them. A 
significant amount of  patenting is not  the result of  formal R&D activities 
though the relative importance of  organized R&D rises with the size of  the 
company. Small firms are likely to be doing relatively more informal R&D, 
reporting less of  it, and hence providing the appearance of  more patents per 
reported R&D dollar.’ Also, for such firms patents may represent their major 
hope for ultimate success and hence would lead them to pursue them with 
more vigor. A well-established major firm does not depend as much on current 
patenting for its viability or the survival of its market position. Thus, even at 
equal underlying true inventiveness rates, the propensity to patent may  be 
lower for large firms, at least relative to the successful new entrants in their 
field. But in the major range of the data, from middle size to giant firms, there 
is little evidence for diminishing returns, at least in terms of patents per R&D 
dollar.*  That is not surprising, after all. If there were such diminishing returns, 
firms could split themselves into divisions or separate enterprises and escape 
them. 
The time-series dimension has been examined most extensively by  Hall, 
Griliches, and Hausman (1986) (see also Pakes and Griliches 1984 and Jerry 
Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984). The estimated total elasticity of patents 
with respect to R&D expenditures is between 0.3 and 0.6, even after allowing 
for several lagged effects. This finding, in contrast to the cross-sectional re- 
sults, is robust with respect to differential weighting and alternative estimation 
methods. It is tempting then to accept the diminishing returns result in the 
7. Sirrilli (1987) shows that in small firms in Italy (fewer than 100 employees) over a third of 
the inventors (36 percent) come from production and quality and control activities, while in the 
large firms (more than 1,000 employees) only 11 percent of the inventors come from this category. 
The proportion of patents originating in formal R&D rises from 39 percent in small firms to 63 
percent in the large ones with the rest (25 and 26 percent) being in the more ambiguous “design” 
category. Similar conclusions can also be inferred from A.  Kleinknecht (1987), who reports a 
significant underestimate of  R&D activities in small firms by  the conventional data collection 
methodology. 
8. See Jensen (1987) for similar results using new  chemical entities rather than patents. For 
contradictory  evidence,  using  other measures,  see  Scherer  (1984b, ch.  11)  and Acs  and Au- 
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Table 13.1  Selectivity of Firms in 1976 Cross-Section,  by Size of Employment 
Number of Firms  Number of Firms 
Employment  in Cross-Section”  in Census of  Enterprisesb  Ratio 
<  10  24  16,000  ,0015 
10-99  30  1  14,300  .02 1 
100-999  952  9,000  ,106 
1 ,ooo+  1,267  1,900  ,667 
Total  2,541  41,200  ,062 
“With good employment data. Computed from the data used in Bound et al. (1984) 
152-98. 
comparable manufacturing industries. From U.S.  Bureau of  the Census (1981),  table 3, pp. 
within-time-series dimension and interpret it as reflecting real diminishing re- 
turns, in terms of patents received, to the expansion of existing research pro- 
grams. But this conclusion is unnecessary. The relationship between annual 
changes in R&D and in patenting is very weak, although “statistically” sig- 
nificant, at the firm level. If  one allows for the possibility that much of the 
annual fluctuations in R&D has little to do with that part of inventive activity 
that generates patents, being largely the result of fluctuations in and vagaries 
of the development portion of the various research projects, then the “relevant” 
R&D is measured with error and the estimated coefficients are downward bi- 
ased. This is not a pure “measurement error” case, because reported R&D may 
be correctly reported as far as its own definition goes, but not exactly in the 
way  we  want  (R&D directed at patentable inventions). This is parallel to 
the transitory-permanent distinction in consumption theory and is isomorphic 
to  the  “errors-in-variables’’ model. Invoking the latter, we  may  be  able to 
“bracket” the true returns to scale coefficient by  running the regression the 
other way, R&D on patents, and computing the reciprocal of the resulting coef- 
ficient. The low correlation between the two rates of change results also in a 
very low coefficient in this second dimension, on the order of 0.1-0.2,  and an 
implication of  increasing  returns. The latter should not be taken  seriously 
either, because it is the result of  the great randomness in the patent series 
themselves. The point of  this digression is, however, to remind one that the 
appearance of diminishing returns in such data could be an artifact of the in- 
completeness of the underlying data rather than a reflection of the characteris- 
tics of the invention process itself. As of the moment, the evidence is sugges- 
tive but not conclusive. 
Besides differing by  size of  firm, the R&D to patents relationship differs 
also across industries. In absolute terms, the industries with the largest num- 
bers of patents are drugs, plastics, other rubber products, and computers (in 
Scherer’s line of business-based data) and instruments, communication equip- 
ment,  and industrial chemicals (in the OTAF concordance-based  data). In 
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are less apparent and more difficult to interpret. One can look at the tables 
(5-9)  in  Griliches (1989) or the appendix to Iain Cockburn and Griliches 
(1988) and observe that industries with a “low” propensity to patent include 
obvious cases of large R&D industries with significant governmental research 
support, such as motor vehicles and aircraft, who patent very much less than 
would be predicted from their R&D numbers alone. Among the industries with 
a “high” propensity to patent, besides the expected presence of communication 
equipment, there are a number of industries (such as screws, nuts, and bolts) 
whose appearance is due to their doing very little R&D but still taking out 
occasional patents. An  attempt to explain the dispersion in  such numbers 
across industries using data from the Yale Survey (Levin et al. 1987) on the 
perceived differential effectiveness of patents as a method of appropriating the 
benefits from innovation was largely unsuccessful. The patent to R&D ratios 
appear to be dominated by  what may be largely irrelevant fluctuations in the 
R&D numbers and the Yale Survey responses themselves appear to have little 
relevant cross-industry variability in them (see Griliches 1987; Cockburn and 
Griliches 1988; and Cockburn 1989). For example, while the drug industry has 
the highest rating on the “patents provide protection” scale, its patents per 
R&D ratio is much lower than that for firms in the paper industry, where the 
effectiveness of patents is rated to be somewhat below average (see Cockburn 
and Griliches 1988, appendix C). Because the effectiveness of patents as an 
appropriability mechanism will affect also the incentive to do R&D, the re- 
sulting impact on the ratio of  the two is far from obvious. In drugs it clearly 
encourages research with the result that even with extensive patenting the ob- 
served ratio is not much above average. Thus, it is probably misleading to inter- 
pret such numbers as being direct indicators of either the effectiveness of  pat- 
enting or the efficiency of the R&D processes. 
13.5  Patent Rights and Patent Values 
Because the economic significance of individual patents is so variable, there 
has been continued interest in trying to estimate the average value of patent 
rights, the average value of  the invention represented by  a particular patent, 
and the dispersion in both of these concepts. Looking at patents as indicators 
of success of the underlying inventive activity or R&D program, we are mainly 
interested in the second concept. The available data, however, are mostly infor- 
mative only about the first: the value associated with the differential legal situa- 
tion created by the possession of the patent. 
There are basically three sources of data on this topic: (1) Results of direct 
surveys of patent owners or assignees about past returns and the potential mar- 
ket value of their rights. (2) The valuation implicit in the decision whether to 
pay  a fee to renew the patent, a decision that had to be made by  European 
patent holders in the past and is now also facing U.S.  patent holders. (3) Econo- 
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such as profits or stock market value, to the number of patents. An example is 
the use of patent numbers as a proxy for “intangible” capital in stock market 
value of the firm regressions. 
The most detailed and extensive survey of  patent holders was conducted 
over 30 years ago by  Barkev Sanders and associates at the Patent and Trade- 
marks Foundation (see J. Rossman and B. s.  Sanders 1957; Sanders, Rossman, 
and L. J. Harris  1958; and Sanders 1962, 1964, and the discussion of  it in 
Schmookler’s book, 1966, pp. 47-55).  They conducted a mail survey in 1957 
of the owners and assignees of a 2 percent random sample of all patents issued 
in 1938, 1948, and 1952. There were two major findings in this survey: (1) A 
surprisingly large fraction of  all sampled patents was reported to have been 
“used” commercially, either currently or in the past. The actual fraction “used” 
is sensitive to the treatment of  nonresponse: It is over 55 percent for those 
responding and about 41 percent if one assumes that nonresponse is equivalent 
to nonuse. The “use” percentage is higher for “small” companies, but so also 
is the nonresponse rate (71 percent used among respondents, 40 percent if 
adjusted for nonresponse). Thus, it is not true that most patents are never used 
and are hence not associated with a significant economic event. This finding is 
also consistent with the renewal information to be discussed below. In Europe, 
about 50 percent of all patents granted are still being renewed and a renewal 
fee is being paid ten years after they had been applied for. (2) The reported 
economic gain from the innovations associated with these patents was highly 
dispersed. Among the patents reported to be in current use and with relevant 
numerical responses and a positive gain (accounting for about 20 percent of 
all the relevant responses), the mean value was $577,000 per patent, but the 
median value was only about $25,000 (implying, under the assumption of log 
normality, 2.5 as the coefficient of variation and a standard deviation of about 
$1.5 million). If one includes all the no gain, loss, and not yet used patents, the 
mean gain falls to about $11  2,000, and the median is close to zero or below 
(computed from the tables in Sanders, Rossman, and Hams 1958, pp. 355 and 
357). Even this lower mean number is quite impressive, roughly equivalent to 
$473,000 per average patent in 1988 prices (using the GNP deflator to convert 
it from 1957 prices), but so also is the associated dispersion. Scherer (1965b) 
reports that fitting a Pareto-Levy distribution to these data graphically yielded 
an estimate of the exponent (a)  of  about 0.5, implying a distribution with no 
finite mean or variance. If  this were truly the case, then even in large samples 
the mean value of patents would not converge rapidly, if at all, to its underlying 
population average. 
There have been only very few other attempts at such a survey and they all 
reach rather similar conclusions. Schmookler (1966, pp. 54-55)  reports on a 
small mail sample with a mean value of $80,000 and a median of  about zero. 
In  1982 the Chemistry Program of the NSF decided to evaluate the economic 
value of patents attributable to its grants (Cutler 1984). Of the 96 patents sur- 
veyed, 52 had been licensed or were deemed licensable with an average “eco- 310  Chapter 13 
nomic value” of about $500,000 per patent. (The concept of “economic value” 
is unclear in this study. It appears to refer to total potential sales of the product 
rather than net returns to the owners of the patent.) A related study, done for 
the NSF by SRI International (1983, examined a sample of patents received 
by the grantees of the Engineering Program and estimated the royalty potential 
of each patent, which turned out to be about $73,000 on average, again with a 
very large dispersion. A more representative and large-scale survey of patent 
holders is both feasible and desirable but nothing has been done in this regard 
since 1957 and there does not seem to be anything like it in the works either 
in the U.S.  or abroad. 
In many countries and recently also in the U.S.,  holders of patents must pay 
an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force. If the renewal fee 
is not paid in any single year the patent is permanently canceled. If we assume 
that renewal decisions are based on economic criteria, agents will renew their 
patents only if  the value of holding them over an additional year exceeds the 
cost of  such renewal. Observations on the proportion of  patents that are re- 
newed at alternative ages, together with the relevant renewal fee schedules, 
will then contain information on the distribution of  the value of holding pa- 
tents, and on the evolution of this distribution function over the lifespan of the 
patents. Because patent rights are seldom marketed, this is one of  the few 
sources of information on their value. In a series of papers Pakes and Schanker- 
man (1984), Pakes (1986), and Schankerman and Pakes (1986) present and 
estimate models that allow them to recover the distribution of  returns from 
holding patents at each age over their lifespan. Because the renewal decision 
is based on the value of patent protection to the patentee, the procedure used 
in these articles directly estimates the private value of the benefits derived from 
the patent laws. 
In Figure 13.7 typical European data on renewal fees and patent survival 
proportions are reproduced from Schankerman and Pakes (1986). They indi- 
cate several interesting facts that should be kept in mind. About half of  all 
patents are renewed through age  10, indicating a significant expectation of 
some “usefulness” for the majority of  patents for some non-negligible time 
period. On the other hand, the same data indicate that about half of all patents 
are not renewed within ten years, indicating that the expected value of  the 
future income stream from these rights has fallen below the rather low renewal 
cost. This implies that the majority of patents are either of low value, or that 
their value depreciates (obsoletes) rapidly, or both. About  10 percent of  all 
patents survive and pay the fees for the whole statutory period and obviously 
include a smaller number of very valuable patents. Pakes and Schankerman 
use these facts in their various papers to construct models of the renewal pro- 
cess and estimate both a distribution of the underlying patent right values and 
also their rate of depreciation. Given the existence of an open-ended class of 
patents in these data (those paying the renewal fees throughout the whole pe- 
riod) and the rather low and relatively stable renewal fee schedules, serious 311  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
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Fig. 13.7  Age paths of deflated renewal costs and renewal proportions 
Source: Schankennan and Pakes (1986), figures 2 and 3. 
Nores: Age = years since granting of  patent. 
C, = deflated renewal costs. 
P, = proportion of patents renewed. 
identification problems arise in such models. The estimates of the mean value 
of  patent rights rest, therefore, on specific assumptions about the functional 
form of their distribution (how it looks in the unseen tail) and on assumptions 
about the form of the depreciation process. Some of these assumptions may be 
testable and some of  the more interesting conclusions of  their work do not 312  Chapter 13 
depend on them, but ultimately we have to put some prior notions into such 
data to have them yield specific numerical answers. The issues of identification 
and estimation are discussed in much detail in the recent papers by Pakes and 
Simpson (1989) and Schankerman (1989), together with the presentation of 
interesting new results on additional countries and on industrial detail, and 
hence will not be pursued further here (see also J. 0.  Lanjouw 1989; Schanker- 
man 1990; and Lanjouw and Schankeman 1989). 
In the United States, patents that were applied for after 1980 have to pay 
renewal fees three and a half, seven and a half, and eleven and a half years 
after the granting date. These fees are currently $450, $890, and $1,340 respec- 
tively for corporations and somewhat less for individuals and “small entities.” 
As of the end of  1988, 16 percent of  the 1981-84  patents coming up to the 
payment of the first maintenance fee “expired,” with a slightly higher expira- 
tion rate for the U.S. (17 percent) than for patents owned by  foreign residents 
(15 percent) implying, possibly, a higher average value or “quality” for the 
latter.9  An earlier study of a smaller sample of such data found that individually 
owned patents were expiring at a much higher rate than assigned patents (39 
versus 13 percent for U.S. origin patents) and that “mechanical” patents had 
the highest and “chemical” patents the lowest rates of expiration (S. E. Man- 
chuso, M. P. Masuck, and E. C. Woodrow 1987). The growing availability of 
such renewal data in the future will provide us with another very interesting 
window on the inventive process and its rewards in the U.S. 
Returning to the specific results from the work on European patent renewals, 
using a learning model for the early years of a patent’s life, Pakes (1986) finds 
that patents are applied for at an early stage in the inventive process, a stage in 
which there is still substantial uncertainty concerning both the returns that will 
be earned from holding the patents, and the returns that will accrue to the 
patented ideas. Gradually the patentors uncover more information about the 
actual value of  their patents. Most turn out to be of  little value, but the rare 
“winner”  justifies the investments that were made in developing them. His esti- 
mates imply also that most of  the uncertainty with respect to the value of  a 
patent is resolved during the first three or four years of its life. Using this result, 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) examine changes in the distribution of patent 
values over time and the correlates of  these changes. The substantive results 
from these papers imply that the average value of a patent right is quite small, 
about $7,000 in the population of patent applications in France and the U.K. 
In Germany, where only about 35 percent of all patent applications are granted 
(about 93 percent and 83 percent were granted in France and the U.K. respec- 
tively), the average value of  a patent right among grants was about $17,000. 
The distribution of these values, however, is very dispersed and skewed. One 
percent of patent applications in France and the U.K. had values in excess of 
9. Based on unpublished tabulations of the Office of Documentation Information at  the U.S. 
Patent Office. 313  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
$70,000  while in Germany  1 percent of patents granted had values in excess 
of $120,000.  Moreover, half of all the estimated value of patent rights accrues 
to between 5  and 10 percent of  all the patents. The annual returns to patent 
protection decay rather quickly over time, with rates of  obsolescence on the 
order of 10 to 20  percent per year. Because about 35,000 patents were applied 
for per year in France and the U.K. and about 60,000  in Germany, these figures 
imply that though the aggregate value of  patent rights is quite large, it is only 
on the order of  10 to 15 percent of the total national expenditures on R&D. 
Other means of appropriating the benefits of R&D must be, therefore, quite im- 
portant. 
Schankerman and Pakes used their results to adjust the aggregate patent time 
series for changes in their average “quality” (value). In their 1986  paper they 
find that even though the number of patents per scientist fell rather sharply 
between 1965 and 1975 in the three countries examined by them, the estimated 
“quality-adjusted’’ total value of patent rights per scientist and engineer was 
effectively stable in both Germany and the U.K., and dropped only slightly in 
France (Schankerman and Pakes 1986,  table ,).lo 
13.6  Patents and Stock Market Value 
Another line of  work has used data on the stock market valuation of  firms 
to investigate both the “value” of patents and the information content of the 
variability in their numbers. The use of  stock market values as an “output” 
indicator of the research process has one major advantage.  All other indicators 
of  success, such as profits or productivity, are likely to reflect it only slowly 
and erratically. On the other hand, when an  event occurs that causes the market 
to reevaluate the accumulated output of  a firm’s research endeavors, its full 
effect on the expected present value of a firm’s future net cash flows should be 
recorded immediately. This, of  course, need not equal what will eventually 
materialize. The downside of  this type of measurement is the large volatility 
in stock market measures. The needle might be there but the haystack can be 
very large. 
The simplest market value model starts from the market valuation identity, 
with the market value of the firm proportional to its physical (“tangible”) and 
intangible capital, the latter being in part the product of its past R&D invest- 
ments and possibly also reflected in its accumulated patent position (Griliches 
1981;  Uri Ben-Zion  1984;  Hirschey  1982;  Cockburn and  Griliches  1988; 
among others). It can be written as follows: 
V = q(A  + gK) = qA(l + gK/A), 
where V is the market value of the firm, A  is the current replacement cost of its 
tangible assets, K is its level of intangible (“knowledge”) capital and g is its 
10. See Pakes and Simpson (1989) and Schankerman (1989 and 1990) for an extension of  these 
results and M. Trajtenberg (1990) for another approach to the same problem. 314  Chapter 13 
relative shadow price, and q is the current premium or discount of market value 
over the replacement cost of tangible assets.” Writing q as exp(a + u), where 
a represents individual firm differences in average valuation due to the exclu- 
sion of other unmeasured capital components or market position variables, tak- 
ing logarithms, and approximating log( 1 + x) =  x,  we can rewrite the estimat- 
ing equation as: 
In Q  =  ln(V/A)  = a + gK/A  + u, 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of what has come to be called 
TobinS  Q. Using different measures of current and past patents and current and 
past R&D expenditures as proxies for K, various researchers have estimated 
this kind of equation. Table 13.2 reproduces a number of results from the Cock- 
bum and Griliches study. It shows that if we look at patents alone the estimated 
value of a recent patent is about $500,000. This estimate is halved when we 
put both past and current R&D expenditures in the equation. By and large, 
R&D is the “stronger” variable. The evidence for additional information in the 
patent variables varies from sample to sample (patents were stronger in the 
Griliches 1981 study, which was based on a much smaller sample of firms but 
also used the panel aspects of the data) and depends on which other variables 
are included in the equation (see the change in the coefficient from column 2 
to 3 in this table).12 
A more dynamic point of view is taken by Pakes (1985) in his analysis of 
the relationship between patents, R&D, and the stock market rate of return. 
Events occur that affect the market value of a firm’s R&D program and what 
one estimates are the reduced-form relationships between the percentage in- 
crease in this value and current and subsequent changes in the firm’s R&D 
expenditures, its patent applications, and the market rate of return on its stock. 
His empirical results indicate that about 5 percent of the variance in the stock 
market rate of return is caused by the events that change both R&D and patent 
applications. This leads to a significant correlation between movements in the 
stock market rate of return and unpredictable changes in both patents and R&D 
expenditures, changes that could not be predicted from past values of patents 
and R&D. On average, an “unexpected” increase in one patent is associated 
with an increase in the firm’s market value of $810,000, while an unexpected 
increase of $100 of R&D expenditures is, on average, associated with a $1,870 
increase in the value of the firm. Patents are estimated to contain a significant 
noise component (a component whose variance is not related to either the R&D 
or the stock market rate of return series). This noise component accounts for 
only a small fraction of the large differences in the number of patent applica- 
11. This equation would hold exactly in a world in which all assets were fully traded in the same 
market. More generally, such an equation is valid in a multicapital setting only under very stringent 
conditions, such as the linear-homogeneity of the profit function. See Wildasin (1984) and Hayashi 
and Inoue (1990) for more discussion. 
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Table 13.2  The Stock Market’s Relative Valuation of R&D and Patents; 
Dependent Variable: Log (Q) 
SP/A  0.493  0.111  0.246 
(0.165)  (0.094)  (0.082) 
WA  1.374  0.741 
(0.182)  (0.152) 
NWA  11.99 
(1.556) 
R2  0.027  0.125  0.258 
Source: Cockburn and Griliches (1987), table 3 
V = market value of the firm. 
A = total net assets at replacement cost. 
Q = V/A. 
K = “stock” of R&D using 15 percent depreciation rate. 
NR = “news in R&D’: current R&D less depreciation of the R&D stock. 
SP = “stock of patents using 30 percent depreciation rate. 
N = 722. Mean of the dependent variable = -0.272;  standard deviation = 0.697. 
Heteroscedasticitiy-consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
All equations also contain an intercept term and the logarithm of  assets, whose coefficient was 
small but consistently significant, on the order of -0.03  (0.01). 
tions of different firms (about 25 percent), but plays a much larger role among 
the smaller fluctuations that occur in the patent applications of a given firm 
over time (about 95 percent). Similarly, the effect of unexpected increases in 
patents on market value is highly variable. Nevertheless, there is still some 
information in the time-series dimension. If we were to observe, for example, 
a sudden large burst in the patent applications of a given firm, we could be 
quite sure that events have occurred to cause a large change in the market value 
of its R&D program; but smaller changes in the patent applications of a given 
firm are not likely to be very informative. 
The timing of  the response of patents and R&D to events that change the 
value of a firm’s R&D effort is quite similar. One gets the impression from the 
estimates that such events cause a chain reaction, inducing an increase in R&D 
expenditures far into the future, and that firms patent around the links of this 
chain almost as quickly as they are completed, resulting in a rather close rela- 
tionship between R&D expenditures and the number of patents applied for. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Pakes finds no evidence that independent changes in the 
number of patents applied for (independent of current and earlier R&D expen- 
ditures) produce significant effects on the market’s valuation of the firm. Hence 
it is not possible to distinguish between demand shocks, where demand shocks 
are loosely defined as events that cause increases in patenting only through the 
R&D expenditures they induce, and technological or supply shocks that may 
have a direct effect on patents as well as an indirect effect via induced R&D 
demand. 316  Chapter 13 
It is not obvious whether one can separate “demand” from “supply” factors 
in this area, even conceptually. One way of defining demand factors is to iden- 
tify them with macro shifts in aggregate demand, population, exchange rates, 
and relative factor prices that make inventive activity more (or less) profitable 
at a given level of scientific information, a fixed “innovation possibilities fron- 
tier.” Changes in technological “opportunity,” on the other hand, are those sci- 
entific and technological breakthroughs that make additional innovation more 
profitable or less costly at a fixed aggregate or industry level demand. These 
distinctions are far from sharp, especially given our inability to measure the 
contributions of science and technology directly. Moreover, what is a techno- 
logical opportunity in one industry may spill over as a derived demand effect 
to another. Nevertheless, there is something distinct in these factors, in their 
sources of change and dynamics.13 
Patent data could help here if one were willing to assume that independent, 
“unanticipated” shifts in the level of patenting by firms represent shifts in tech- 
nological opportunities and not responses to changes in economic conditions 
(demand forces). That is, the identifying assumption is that demand impinges 
on the level of  patenting only through the level of  R&D expenditures (and 
slowly changing trends) and that the “news” component in the patent statistics 
reflects technological “news,” the information that a particular line of research 
has turned out to be more (or less) fruitful or easier (harder) than expected 
when the decision to invest in it was made originally. Changes in technological 
opportunity are thus identified with “abnormal,” “unexpected,” bursts (or de- 
clines) in the number of patents applied for. 
Several implications of this formulation are immediate. If  patent statistics 
contain additional information about shifts in technological opportunities, then 
they should be correlated with current changes in market value above and be- 
yond their current relationship with R&D and they should affect R&D levels 
in the future, even in the presence of the change in market value variable be- 
cause the latter variable is measured with much error. Patents should “cause” 
R&D in the sense of Granger (1969). 
The available evidence on this point is not too encouraging: As noted above, 
Griliches (1981) found a significant independent effect of patents on the mar- 
ket values of firms, above and beyond their R&D expenditures, but Pakes did 
not detect a significant influence of lagged patents on R&D in the presence of 
lagged R&D and the stock market rate of return variables. Nor did Hall, Gril- 
iches, and Hausman (1986) find future R&D affecting current patenting as the 
“causality” argument might have  implied. Griliches, Hall, and Pakes (1991) 
replicate some of  Pakes’s  computations on a larger sample (340 firms) and 
expand his equation system to add equations for sales, employment, and invest- 
13. This is, of course, related to Schmookler’s distinction between patents classified by industry 
of origin versus industry of use. “Who does the invention” depends more on supply considerations. 
“For whom the invention is done” is more likely to be affected by demand shifts. 317  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
ment. Their results indicate that the addition of the latter variables is helpful, 
in the sense that fluctuations in their growth rates are related to fluctuations in 
both the growth rate of R&D and the stock market rate of return and hence 
should help in identifying the relationships we are interested in. But the expan- 
sion of  the sample to include many small firms with low levels of patenting 
deteriorates significantly the informational content of this variable, raising its 
noise to signal ratio, and making it hard to discern a feedback from the inde- 
pendent variability in patenting to any of the other variables. Thus, at the mo- 
ment, it does not look as if  the data can sustain a model with two separate 
factors (“market”.  and “technological” innovations), even though in principle 
such a model is identifiable. 
The difficulties in implementing such models arise to a large extent from 
the large “noise” component in patents as indicators of  R&D output in the 
short-run within-firm dimension. While the problem may have been obvious 
from the beginning, it was the work of  Pakes and Schankerman (1984) and 
their estimates of the dispersion and the skewness in patent value that alerted 
us to its actual magnitude. 
To derive quantitative implications of  such a skewed distribution of  values 
for the quality of this indicator we can combine what we  know about patent 
counts in both the time-series and cross-section dimension with estimates of 
the distribution of their values. 
One can write the innovation in the value of  the firm (net of  its expected 
dividend and investment policy) as the sum of three components: 
q,v = w,  + rl, + ur1 
where q, is the rate of  return on stock holding, V,  is the total market value of 
the firm’s  assets, and the three components w,,  qt, and  u, are defined to be 
orthogonal to each other; w,  corresponds to the change in the value of a firm’s 
R&D  “position” (program) arising from the “news” associated with current 
patent applications; q,  reflects revaluations of  previous achievements associ- 
ated with past patents (above and beyond their correlation with current pa- 
tents); while u, reflects all other sources of fluctuation in the value of the firm, 
including also possibly the contribution of not patented R&D.  Looking first at 
w,  and the role of patent numbers as an indicator of it, we can ask about the 
possible magnitude of the variance of w,  (relative to the variance of q,V,).  That 
is, how large could the contribution of current patents be to the explanation of 
fluctuations in market value, even if we had a perfect measure of these values? 
To decompose the variance of the first component, we write it as 
P 
i=l  w = ZYi 
and assume that (1) p,  the number of patents applied for each year, is distrib- 
uted as a Poisson random variable with a mean, X,  which is a distributed lag 
of past R&D expenditures (see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984); and (2) yi 318  Chapter 13 
is the underlying value of each patent and is distributed as a log-normal ran- 
dom variable with a mean and variance that will be derived from the earlier lit- 
erature. 
The first two moments of w (under independence) are 
E(w)  = E(py) = AE(y)  where  A  = E(p) 
The component of  the variance of w that could be accounted for by  patent 
numbers corresponds to the last term 
var[pY] = ATz, 
and its relative size is given by 
var(py)/var(w)  =  1/[1 + v(y)/E(~)~] 
=  1/(1 + T*)$ 
where T is the coefficient of variation in the distribution of patent values. 
Turning to the literature for some order of magnitude estimates of various 
parameters, we have estimates of the mean value of the news associated with 
patents in the U.S. of between $200,000 (Griliches 1981) and $800,000 (Pakes 
1985) per patent. There is also some information on this point in Griliches, 
Hall, and Pakes (1991): an estimate of  $98,000 per unexpected patent at the 
geometric mean of their data (with a very large standard error). For the drug 
industry, where patents are more important, there is a larger and somewhat 
more precise estimate: an $821,000 average increase in the value of the firm 
per unexpected patent. This, in fact, is very similar to the Pakes estimate which 
was based on a smaller sample of larger firms and is therefore more compara- 
ble to their drug firms’ subset. 
Taking the upper range of  these numbers, $800,000 per “unexpected” pa- 
tent, and using A = 13, the average (geometric) number of patents received in 
the Griliches, Hall, Pakes sample (per year, per firm), the expected contribu- 
tion of the variance in patent numbers to the average variance in market value 
is 13(0.8)’ (mil$)’ = $8.3 million squared. To  get an estimate of varb), I bor- 
row the estimated coefficient of  variation of the distribution of patent values 
from Pakes (1986) and Schankerman and Pakes (  1986).14  Both of these articles 
produced coefficients of  variation on the order of  2 to 3.6. Because we are 
looking for upper-bound estimates, taking 3.6 and applying it to the “upper”- 
range estimate of  Ey = $0.8 million gives an estimate of the total variance of 
w  as 
14. Schankerman and Pakes estimate the value of  the patent rights. I assume that the value of 
the underlying innovation is proportional to its patent right value and highly correlated to it. 319  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
13[(3.6 x  0.8)’  + (0.8)’]  = $116 million sq. 
This is to be compared to the average variance of q,V,. The variance of q in the 
Griliches, Hall, and Pakes sample is 0.133 which, evaluated at the geometric 
average value of their firms ($276 million), yields a variance of market value 
changes on the order of $10,000 million squared. Comparing the two variances 
gives an estimate of the relative importance of fluctuations in the market value 
of new patented innovations as at about  1 percent of the total fluctuations in 
market value.I5  That is, even if one had good estimates of patent values, they 
would account for little of the fluctuations in market value. Having numbers 
instead of values makes matters much worse, reducing this fraction even fur- 
ther. The contribution of patent numbers to the variance in their values is only 
on the order of 7 percent [  1/(  1 + (3.6)’)], and their contribution to the explana- 
tion of the variance in the unexpected changes in the market values of individ- 
ual firms is much smaller (less than 0.1 percent).16 One should not, therefore, 
use data on stock market fluctuations in this fashion to test detailed hypotheses 
about the information content of patent statistics. On the other hand, while the 
estimated variance components are rather small, they should not be interpreted 
as implying that the returns to inventive activity are small or that the topic we 
have been pursuing is not interesting, only that we have been looking for our 
particular needle in a very large haystack. 
13.7  Spillovers and Other Uses of Patent Data 
A major unresolved issue in the area of economics of technology is the iden- 
tification and measurement of R&D spillovers, the benefits that one company 
or industry receives from the R&D activity of  another. It is difficult to trace 
such spillovers without having strong a priori notions about who are the poten- 
tial beneficiaries of  whose research (see Griliches 1979, pp.  102-5  for addi- 
tional discussion of these issues). One way to approach this problem is to use 
15. There are two major problems in using this procedure to estimate the variance of the news 
in the economic value of patents held by  the firm: The first is that the distribution estimated by 
Schankerman and Pakes is a distribution of the value of patent rights, which may vary less than 
proportionally with the true economic value of the associated invention to the firm. The second 
problem probably goes in the other direction: Some of the change in the firm’s patent value this 
year may not be.  news, and thus may have already been incorporated into the market value at the 
beginning of the year. Allowing for some predictability of patent numbers would only reduce such 
fractions further, multiplying them essentially by  1 -  R2 of the prediction equation. (See Griliches, 
Hall, and Pakes 1991 for a more detailed discussion of this and related issues.) 
16. An alternative approach to this question is developed in Griliches, Hall, and Pakes by model- 
ing the components of variance in stock market value surprises explicitly as functions of current 
and past patenting and R&D activity, allowing one to estimate also the contribution of revisions 
in past patents’ values to current changes in market value. Though the resulting estimates are 
rather imprecise, because they are based essentially on fourth moments of the data, they do imply 
that the variance in the news about the value of patents (current and past) could account for about 
5 percent of the total variance in market value surprises, a number that may look low but is actually 
as high as any that have been found in other studies of market value revisions. Only about one- 
fifth of this, however, can be attributed to news associated with current patent applications. 320  Chapter 13 
the detailed information on patenting by type of patent (patent class) to cluster 
firms into common “technological activity” clusters and determine whether a 
firm’s variables are related to the overall activity levels of its cluster. 
In his thesis and several recent papers, Adam Jaffe (1983, 1985, 1986, 1988) 
has used firm level data on patenting by class of patent and on the distribution 
of sales by four-digit SIC to cluster firms into 21 distinct technological clusters 
and 20 industry (sales orientation) clusters. It turns out that these two criteria 
lead to different clusterings. Using the technological clusters, Jaffe constructed 
a measure of the total R&D “pool” available for spillovers (borrowing or steal- 
ing) in a cluster. He then looked at three “outcome” variables: R&D investment 
ratio for the firm (in 1976), patents received (average number applied for dur- 
ing 1975-77),  and output growth, between  1972 and 1977. In each of these 
cases, his measure of the R&D pool contributed significantly and positively to 
the explanation of the firm  level “outcome” variables even in the presence of 
industry dummies (based on sales clustering). Not surprisingly, perhaps, firms 
in technological clusters with large overall R&D “pools” invested more inten- 
sively in R&D than would be predicted just from their industrial (SIC) loca- 
tion. More interesting is the finding that firms received more patents per R&D 
dollar in clusters where more R&D was performed by others, again above and 
beyond any pure industry differences (based on a classification of their sales). 
Similarly, his analysis of firm productivity growth during the 1972-77  period 
showed that it was related positively to both the average R&D intensity of the 
individual firms and the change in the size of the R&D pool available to these 
firms. In terms of profits, or market value, there were, however, both positive 
and negative effects of neighboring firms’ R&D. The net effect was positive 
for high R&D firms, but firms with R&D about one standard deviation below 
the mean were made worse off overall by the R&D of others. Here the idea of 
R&D spillovers is made operational by  using the firm’s patenting pattern to 
construct a measure of its location in “technological space” and showing that 
the R&D of others, weighted inversely to their distance from this location, has 
an observable impact on its own success. More recently, Jaffe (1989) has used 
regional data on patenting to investigate spillovers from academic research. 
Patent documents also contain citations to other, previous patents. Following 
the growth of  interest in citations in general and the development of computer 
software that allows the search for all subsequent citations of a particular patent 
(or article), there has been a growing interest in using citations counts as alterna- 
tive “indexes” of differential quality. It should be noted here that patent citations 
differ from usual scientific citations to the work of others in that they are largely 
the contribution of patent examiners whose task is to delimit the reach of the 
new patent and note the context in which it is granted. In that sense, the “objec- 
tivity” of such citations is greater and may contribute to the validity of citation 
counts as indexes of relative importance. But in another sense, they are like 
citations added at the insistence of the editor; they may reflect the importance 
that  is put  in  the  field  on  particular papers but  are not  a  valid  indicator 321  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
for channels of influence, for intellectual spillovers. On the other hand, they 
bring us closer to something that might be interpreted as measuring the social 
rather than just the private returns to these patents. 
The use of patent citations as “indicators” is discussed, largely in a biblio- 
metric style, by R. S.  Campbell and A. L. Nieves (1979), Carpenter, Narin, and 
Woolf  (1981), Carpenter and F.  Narin (1983), and Narin, E. Noma, and R. 
Perry (1987) (see also the more general discussion of  bibliometric evidence 
in Office of Technology Assessment 1986, chap. 3). An interesting economic 
application is to be found in M. Trajtenberg (1990) who shows that citation- 
weighted patent numbers are more closely correlated with his “output” mea- 
sure, consumer surplus gains from the development and diffusion of CAT scan- 
ners (computed tomography), while unweighted patent counts are more closely 
related to “input,” to R&D expenditures by the various firms in this field. (For 
another application of  citation data see Lieberman 1987.) This way  of  using 
patent data is only in its beginnings and we are likely to see a much wider use 
of it in the future. 
A number of studies have tried to “validate” patents as indicators of techni- 
cal change by connecting them to counts of innovations, new chemical entities, 
and subsequent measures of  profits or growth. One of  the earliest and best 
studies of this kind (William Comanor and Scherer 1969) related pharmaceuti- 
cal patents to the number of new chemical entities and all new products intro- 
duced by the different firms in subsequent years and found a closer relationship 
between patent applications (rather than grants) with all new products (rather 
than just the number of  new chemical entities). I will not consider in detail a 
number of studies that found varying degrees of relationship between patents 
and “invention” or “innovation” counts, because the subjectivity and elasticity 
of such innovation count data make their results very difficult to interpret. For 
examples of  such work see B. Achilladelis, A. Schwarzkopf, and M. Cines 
(1987),  Basberg  (1982),  Kleinknecht  (1982),  and  Walsh  (1984).  Scherer 
(1965a) shows a positive relationship between earlier patenting rates and sub- 
sequent profitability and sales growth differences in a cross-section of firms, 
but I know of no studies that relate “successfully” patenting rates or patenting 
stocks to subsequent growth of productivity at the firm level. 
Patent data have been used by Pavitt and Soete and their associates to ana- 
lyze the relative “competitiveness” of various countries, to construct “revealed 
technology advantage” indexes for various countries, and to describe and con- 
trast the international location of inventive activity in different industries (Pav- 
itt and  Soete 1980, 1981; Pavitt  1982; Pavitt and Pate1  1988; Soete 1987). 
Patents have been used by  economic historians to study regional patterns of 
economic growth and the externalities of population size and agglomeration 
(Allen  Kelley  1972; K.L. Sokoloff  1988; Sokoloff and B.Z. Khan  1989, 
among others). There have been also many other attempts to use patent data in 
different areas of economic analysis. It is not possible, unfortunately, to do 
justice to all of them here. 322  Chapter 13 
13.8  Aggregate Trends in Patenting and the Bureaucratic Cycle 
Among the various explanations of  the worldwide productivity slowdown 
in the 1970s, the exhaustion of inventive and technological opportunities re- 
mains one of the major suspects in the case. This suspicion was fed by one of 
the more visible statistical facts: The total number of patents granted peaked 
in the U.S. around 1970 and then declined through most of  the  1970s (see 
Figure 13.1). Similar trends could also be observed in patenting worldwide, 
except in Japan (see Robert Evenson 1984; Englander, Evenson, and Hanazaki 
1988, and Soete et al. 1989). These same data also fed the idea that the United 
States had lost its competitive inventive edge. If one looks at the data on patents 
granted to U.S. corporations they peaked in the mid-1960s and have not really 
recovered since (see Figure 13.2). A related notion is diminishing returns to 
inventive activity, to investments in R&D. Looking at Figure 13.2 one notices 
the much more rapid rate of growth in national R&D expenditures than in total 
patenting and the implicit suggestion of diminishing returns. 
Two important aspects of these data are visible in Figure 13.1: Trends in 
patent grants do not always follow those of  patent applications and there have 
been cycles before. An application for a patent is filed when the expected value 
of receiving the patent exceeds the cost of applying for it. The expected value 
of  a patent equals the probability that it will be granted, times the expected 
economic value of  the rights associated with the particular patented item or 
idea, minus the potentially negative effects arising from its disclosure.  A patent 
is granted if it passes certain minimal standards of novelty and potential utility. 
These standards can change over time, both as a result of changes in perception 
of what is an innovation and as the result of changing “applications” pressure 
on a relatively fixed number of patent office workers. Moreover, a change in 
the resources of  the patent office or in its efficiency will introduce changes 
in the lag structure of  grants behind applications, and may produce a rather 
misleading picture of  the underlying trends. In  particular, the decline in  the 
number of patents granted in the 1970s is almost entirely an artifact, induced 
by fluctuations in the Patent Office, culminating in the sharp dip in 1979 due 
to the absence of budget for printing the approved patents.” 
This can be seen most easily in Figure 13.8 which plots the number of grants 
that would be predicted by a “constant” Patent Office policy and performance, 
that is, a 65 percent approval rate and a constant lag structure. The graph of 
such a “prediction” is essentially flat throughout the 1970s, reflecting the rough 
constancy of  total applications during this period and  implying  a marked 
change in the lag structure of the granting process during the last 20 years. In 
the late 1960s it took more than three years for half of the eventual grants to 
17. The impact of  changes in bureaucratic procedures on shorter-run aspects of these data is 
discussed in G. G. Brunk and G. Demack (1987), who point out that since 1968, the Patent Office 
has been issuing a fixed number of patents each week, with this number changing, from time to 
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Fig. 13.8  Actual versus predicted patent grants and the number of patent 
examiners, 1947-1989 
Source: Griliches (1989), figure 3, updated. 
Note:  Predicted grants (based on a “fixed’ Patent Office policy) = .65(.1  APPL-, + .61  APPL-, 
+ .25 APPL-,  + .04 APPL-,). 
be issued. A campaign to reduce these lags and eliminate the accumulating 
backlog was begun in 1971 and brought down the fraction taking more than 
three years to about 10 percent by the late 1970s. But by the early 1980s the 
Patent Office ran into another budgetary crisis and the backlog began to grow 
again (see Griliches 1989,  table 1). 
Looking at shorter-run fluctuations in the total number of  patents granted 
one can see that they are much more closely associated with the number of 
examiners than with the inflow of patent applications (“predicted grants” being 
just a scaled moving average of recent applications). It is obvious that the de- 
cline in patents granted in the 1970s came not from a decline in applications- 
they declined very little-but  from the contraction in the resources of the Pa- 
tent Office. This particular indicator of “technological decline” is, thus, noth- 
ing more than a bureaucratic mirage! 
Another way  of  making this point is via the estimation of  a Patent Office 
“production function,” which looks at the number of patents granted as a func- 
tion of  two major “inputs”: the internal resources available to it, the average 
number of  patent examiners, and the “materials” it has to work with, lagged 324  Chapter 13 
Table 13.3  The Patent Office “Production Function” 
Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
Variables 
Log Total Grants  Log Domestic Grants 
1925-87  1945-87  1945-87 
Log average examiner 
Log predicted grants 
Time 
Time squared 
Log domestic predicted grants 
Log foreign predicted grants 



















































Source: Griliches (1989). table 2. 
Average examiner = [examiners (- 1) + examiners (- 2) + examiners (- 3)]/3. 
Predicted grants = .65[.1 Appl(-1)  + .61 Appl(-2)  + .25Appl(-3)  + .MAppl(-4)]. 
Same formula for predicted domestic and foreign grants as a function of domestic and foreign applica- 
tions. 
AR( 1) = first-order autoregressive serial correlation adjustment. 
SEE = standard error of estimate (standard deviation of estimated residuals). 
Logit foreign applications ratio: log[(Fr AppVror Appl)]l[  1 -  (Fr AppVrot Appl)]. 
applications. Table 13.3 presents a number of such regressions for the 1925-87 
and 1945-87  periods (examiner data are not available before 1920) and finds 
that the major determinant of the number of patents granted is the number of 
patent examiners employed by  the Patent Office (averaged over the previous 
three years) with an  estimated coefficient (elasticity) of  approximately one. 
The supply of applications is important but it works largely through the exam- 
iner variable. Examiners are employed, in part, in response to application pres- 
sure and the state of the accumulating backlog. There is also a negative trend 
in the “efficiency” of patent examiners, perhaps as the result of the rising com- 
plexity of  applications and the increasing size of  the literature that needs to 
be searched.’* 
A parallel analysis of  grants to domestic inventors yields similar results. 
18. See Scherer et al. (1959,  p. 134) for evidence of rising complexity. 325  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
Most of the variability in their numbers is again attributable to the number of 
examiners. But there is also evidence of  a significant negative effect of  the 
rising number of foreign applications, represented in Table 13.3 by the number 
of  “predicted” grants to foreigners or the logit transformed ratio of  foreign 
applications. Both versions of  this variable indicate a “crowding out” of  do- 
mestic patents by the rising tide of foreign applications and provide a substan- 
tive interpretation for the negative trend in this equation. This does not “solve,” 
however, all of  the mystery. In the case of  domestic patents there has been 
also a decline in applications in the 1970s, which requires an interpretation of 
its own. 
13.9  Aggregate Patenting and the Business Cycle 
One explanation for the decline in the rate of domestic patent applications 
in the 1970s is the worldwide deterioration in economic conditions and expec- 
tations that occurred as the result of the two oil price shocks and the govern- 
mental efforts to contain the resulting inflationary forces (Griliches 1988). The 
notion that inventive activity is largely “demand” driven had its strongest pro- 
ponent in Schmookler (1966), who showed that inventive activity (as measured 
by patents) was related to earlier movements in investment and output of the 
relevant industries. (See also the later summation of his position in Schmookler 
1972, pp. 70-84.)  His work can be, and has been, criticized on several levels. 
In the longer run, “supply” forces, in the form of  new  discoveries and the 
steady contribution of new scientific knowledge, surely have an important role 
to play (Nathan Rosenberg 1974). Moreover, by current econometric standards 
the evidence presented by  Schmookler for his conclusions does not look all 
that strong (though it gains conviction by  the cumulative force of the various 
bits and pieces examined, and by  observing the working of a knowledgeable 
and first-rate mind grappling with the problem and coming to a considered 
judgment). Subsequent empirical work on this topic, by  Scherer (1965a and 
1982b), P.  Stoneman (1979), Geoffrey Wyatt  (1986), Derek Bosworth and 
Tony Westaway (1984), C. Papachristodoulou (1986), and Kleinknecht and B. 
Verspagen (1990), have either supported his original conclusions or weakened 
them, but no one has really overturned them.19 In any case, at the level of an- 
nual fluctuations that we are looking at, demand forces are likely to be more 
important and easier to detect than the much slower “supply” forces whose 
effects take longer to accumulate. 
Table 13.4 presents a number of different attempts to explain the total num- 
19. A number of studies, following Stoneman, have regressed the log of patents on the log of 
R&D per patent, interpreting the latter variable as a measure of the “cost” of invention, and the 
resulting negative coefficient as an indication of the workings of “supply” forces. But the sign of 
this coefficient could reflect nothing more than the spuriousness of such a relationship, induced 
by the large transitory or measurement error component in patent numbers. On the latter possibility 
see Griliches, Hall, and Pakes (1991). 326  Chapter 13 
Table 13.4  Determinants of Applications for U.S. Patents by U.S. Residents, 
1953-87;  Dependent Variable: Log of Domestic Patent Applications 
Variables  Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors) and Period 
Time 
DLNTDF 
DLNTDF( -  1) 







1953-87  1954-87 
-  ,000  -.017  -.018 
(.005)  (.004) 
(.097) 
(.098) 
.338  ,410 
(.094)  (.075) 
-  ,279 
-.257 
.0507  ,0425  .0326 
-  ,029  ,256  ,561 
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Source: Griliches (1989). table 6. 
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= standard deviation of the estimated residuals. 
= the rate of growth in the national defense component of  real GNP. 
= logarithm of company-financed R&D expenditures in industry, deflated. 
= logarithm of total ‘‘real’’ basic research expenditures in universities, deflated 
= logarithm of the ratio of the R&D to the implicit GNP deflators. 
ber of domestic patent applications in the U.S. during the last 30 years or so. 
Because reasonably consistent R&D data at the national level do not exist be- 
fore 1953, most of the analyses are based on the 1954-87  period.Z0  There are 
a number of  interesting findings in this table. (1) For the period as a whole 
(1953 to 1987)  there was no significant decline in the number of patent applica- 
20. Taking the longer-run view and looking at periods with no R&D data, one can reproduce 
the main outlines  of  Schmookler’s results. For example,  for the whole  1880-1987  period (88 
years), one gets (in first differences of logarithms format): 
gdu  =  -.006  +  ,110  ggpdi  +  .299  ggnp(-1) 
(.009)  (.030)  (.128) 
R  = 0.15,  SEE  = 0.075,  D-W  =  1.87, 
where the rate of growth in domestic patent applications (gdu) is related positively to the current 
rate of growth in gross private domestic investment (ggpdi) and the lagged rate of growth in real 
GNP (ggnp). Because the post-World  War I1 period exhibits much less variance, the results are 
much weaker there, but not all that different. During this later period we have, however, actual 
direct “input” measures, such as R&D expenditures and the number of scientists and engineers 
engaged in R&D, and they dominate the aggregate economy indexes such as GNP or GPDI. 327  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
tions in the U.S. by U.S. residents. Because there was a positive rate of growth 
in real R&D over this period, at least if  one uses the standard deflators, any 
attribution of a positive influence to them will imply the finding of a negative 
time trend in the patents “production function.” (2) Fluctuations in R&D do 
affect the number of patents applied for, but less than proportionately. Among 
the various possible measures of R&D, company expenditures on R&D “work 
best,” as long as only one measure of R&D is to be included in the equation. 
Findings (1) and (2) together imply a negative trend in the “propensity to pa- 
tent” or in the “efficiency” of patent “production” of about -  l to -2 percent 
per year. The estimated coefficient of the company R&D variable is quite high 
and significant, between 0.2 and 0.4, and is consistent with earlier findings 
based on micro data (see Section 13.4). (3) Changes in the size of the defense 
establishment, in the form of current and lagged changes in real gross national 
product devoted to national defense, have a large and significantly negative 
effect on the number of domestic patents applied for and perhaps also on actual 
levels of inventive activity. The estimated effect is large, a decline of 5 percent 
in domestic patenting as the result of  a 10 percent increase in defense GNP, 
and it is quite robust to the introduction or deletion of other variables. This 
finding is consistent with both the view  that  defense expenditures pull re- 
sources away from inventive activity and with the view that they channel inven- 
tive activity into areas where patenting is either more difficult or less impor- 
tant. (4) There is evidence in these data of  a positive contribution of  basic 
research in universities to the overall level of  domestic inventive activity as 
measured by the total number of domestic patent applications. (5)  There is also 
some evidence that the rising real cost of R&D, in the form of the ratio of the 
R&D to GNP price deflators, has had a negative impact on patenting, either 
because it reflects also the rising cost of patenting relative to other economic 
activities, or because it adjusts in part for the “underdeflation” of  the R&D 
variables by  the same set of deflators. All of these conclusions are tentative. 
They are based on highly aggregated data, a rather short time period, and a 
highly multicollinear set of  examined variables.21  Looking at industry (2.5 
digit) level data does not help much, nor does it change the results significantly 
(see Griiiches 1989).22 
These macro results do not really help to explain the longer-run trends. For 
the period as a whole, 1954 through 1987, there is no actual decline in patent- 
ing to explain and also no substantive change in the rate of growth of defense 
expenditures. But unless the R&D deflators are all wrong, the data do indicate 
21. The simple correlation of company R&D with time and real GNP is 0.99 and 0.98 respec- 
tively, and it is about 0.94 with either university basic research or total R&D in industry. 
22. Attempts to extend these results by adding more “demand” side variables such as changes in 
real GNP, capacity utilization, or stock price indexes were not successful. Almost all of the system- 
atic short-run variability in aggregate domestic patenting is picked up by fluctuations in the R&D 
and national defense variables. All of the other demand variables appear to be working via these 
variables. 328  Chapter 13 
a rather significant growth in both private company R&D expenditures in in- 
dustry and basic R&D expenditures in universities at 5 and 8 percent per year 
respectively, which should have resulted in some increase in the observed rate 
of patenting. Thus, we are left more or less where we started, with a significant 
unexplained decline in U.S. patenting relative to the ongoing investment in 
R&D. 
13.10  A Shrinking Yardstick? 
Before we look at the longer-run trend in domestic patenting and discuss its 
interpretation as an indicator of inventive activity, it is worth stressing that from 
the point of view of  the measurement of  technical change in the US., using 
total factor productivity measures or related indexes, domestic patenting may 
not be the relevant magnitude. Total patents may be a better measure of  shifts 
in “technology,” in the “production possibilities frontier.” Foreign inventions 
should have a similar impact on total factor productivity and therefore, from 
the point of view of measures of technological “opportunity” available to the 
U.S. economy, it may not matter whence the invention came. The level of do- 
mestic patenting may be more relevant, however, for studies of  “competitive- 
ness’’ and when thinking about rates of return to domestic R&D. 
Figure 13.9 plots (on a common log scale) the long-term data on domestic 
patent applications, real GNP, and gross private domestic investment (in lieu 
of  R&D data which are not really available before the 1950~).~~  Several inter- 
esting facts stand out in this chart: After growing at roughly the same rate as 
real GNP in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, domestic patent 
applications peaked in the late 1920s and have not achieved such levels again. 
After a severe decline during the Great Depression and the early war years 
and a brief postwar recovery, they stayed essentially flat throughout the whole 
postwar period, while both GNP and total and corporate R&D expenditures 
were growing. These facts led Schmookler (1966, pp. 28-30)  to declare such 
data not really comparable between the pre-  and post-World  War  I1 periods. 
He gave three reasons for the “shortfall” in the more recent period: (1) the 
change in judicial and political climate in the late 1930s, which became much 
more hostile to corporate patenting and the enforcement of patent rights, re- 
ducing thereby the value of applying for one; (2) the growth in delays in pro- 
cessing patent applications at the Patent Office, which reduced the ultimate 
value of such protection; and (3) the rise of industries where there is less reli- 
ance on patents and more on secrecy and on first-mover advantage, and the 
realization by many corporations that they might be able to do without patent- 
ing. What Schmookler did not mention explicitly is the rise in the real wage 
23. The domestic patent application numbers are extrapolated backward, before  1940, by the 
number of  total patent applications, foreign applications constituting less than 10 percent of the 
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Fig. 13.9  Patent applications by U.S. residents and real GNP and investment, 
1880-1989,  log scale 
Source: Griliches (1989), figure 4, updated. 
Note: Domestic applications  extrapolated  back, before 1940, by  the number of total applications. 330  Chapter 13 
and hence the rise in the opportunity cost of dealing with the patent system. 
This rise in real wages contributed to the significant decline in the number of 
patents issued to “independent” inventors and probably also to a higher thresh- 
old of potential value for corporations before they would file an application. If 
this is true, then the relative stagnation of domestic applications in the postwar 
period does not preclude the possibility that real inventive activity and its out- 
put were rising at the same time. 
Schmookler’s first two explanations appear less cogent today. (The judicial 
climate has actually reversed itself recently.) The third explanation, that the 
lack of growth in domestic patent applications is due to changes in the indus- 
trial mix, away from traditionally high patenting areas (such as chemicals) and 
toward the faster-growing, lower-patenting industries such as computers, has 
been disputed by  Griliches (1989). He used “fixed” patent per R&D dollar 
intensities (from Bound et al. 1984 and Scherer 1984a) together with the indus- 
trial distribution of company R&D expenditures in 1957 and 1985 to compute 
a “predicted” average number of  patents per R&D dollar, with a result that 
goes in the right direction but is rather small: a -3  percent adjustment for the 
whole 1957-76  period. It is small both because patenting intensities are not all 
that different across industries and because the industrial composition of R&D 
did not change drastically during this period.” 
Another possible explanation is the overestimation of the growth in “real” 
R&D due to an underestimate by conventional R&D “deflators” of the growth 
in the real cost of doing science, in finding new drugs and new compounds, 
and in designing new chips. If the “real” cost of doing R&D has risen by about 
3 to 4 percent more per year than is indicated by  the conventional deflators, 
most of the observed decline in patenting per R&D dollar would be eliminated 
(Daniel Smith 1988).25  It is rather difficult, however, to distinguish this from 
various other versions of the exhaustion of the scientific frontiers hypothesis. 
Why is the cost of real science rising faster than a reasonably weighted index 
of scientific salaries and a quality-adjusted price index of scientific instruments 
and equipment? Is it because the competition from other scientists within the 
country and abroad is driving up the resources necessary to produce a unit of 
visible advance in a field? Is this not just a reflection of diminishing returns to 
R&D investments when they are applied to a fixed or a slower-growing under- 
lying scientific opportunities set, of crowding out and fishing out? (See also 
the discussion in Englander, Evenson, and Hanazaki 1988 on this.) 
13.11  The Specter of Diminishing Returns 
Aggregate patent numbers (applied and granted) have fluctuated greatly in 
the past. They have also grown more slowly in this century, much less so than 
24. See Hall (1988) for similar results. 
25. “For an institution viewed as a whole, with a constant complement of young scientists, typi- 
cal weighted growth rates per scientist (in the  ‘sophistication factor’) might be 2-5  percent in 
constant-value terms per annum . . .” A. V. Cohen and L. N. Ivins (1967, p. 28). 331  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
investments in R&D, which has led scholarly observers to wonder repeatedly 
about the implied slackening in the growth rate of technical progress. In 1935, 
Robert K. Merton wrote: “In the U.S.,  however, the number of  patents has 
scarcely kept pace with the growth of population since 1885-a  fact which 
may lead us to suspect the possibility of a slackening in the rate of technologic 
advance generally” (p. 454). At the same time, S. C. Gilfillan (1935) was blam- 
ing the decline in patenting on the decline in the native ability of the American 
people, due to  immigration and dysgenics, because “the stupid have  been 
breeding at a much higher rate” (pp. 218-19).  In  1952,  Alfred B. Stafford won- 
dered “Is the Rate of Invention Declining?’ as he observed a declining trend 
in patenting, from 1916 through 1947, in two-thirds of  all the patent classes, 
and worried about diminishing returns on one hand and the increasing com- 
plexity of invention on the other26  (see also Schmookler 1954).  The same point 
was taken up by  Scherer et al. in  1959: “. . . the sharp decline in patenting 
during the depressed 1930’s can be attributed to unfavorable economic condi- 
tions, while the slump during World War I1 is explained by the historical ten- 
dency for patenting to decline during wartime. But no such ready explanation 
is available for the continued record of sluggishness during the booming post- 
war period” (p.  130). He then attributed some of  this  decline, as did also 
Schmookler (1966) later on, to a change in the judicial climate and especially 
to the increase in compulsory licensing decrees. But that does not  seem to 
explain all of the decline, or its persistence into the 1970s. And this type of 
worry continues to this day, as can be seen in Baily and Chakrabarti (1988), 
Scherer (1986), and this paper itself. One can always worry that the world is 
coming to an end. Someday it undoubtedly will, but it does not look as if the 
end is already upon us, at least not yet. 
What are the facts, so far as they can be discerned? There has been no abso- 
lute decline in the rate of patenting in the U.S. Total patent grants and applica- 
tions are running about 30 percent above the early 1960s, and U.S. domestic 
patent applications have also recovered to the levels attained in the 1960s. The 
question then is, do we need a growing rate of invention (if patent numbers do 
indeed measure it) to sustain a steady positive rate of  growth in total factor 
productivity? Does the faster growth in real R&D expenditures indicate dimin- 
ishing returns to R&D or an improvement in the quality of patented inventions? 
And could the, we hope temporary, 11 percent decline in the average number 
of domestic patent applications, between its peak in 1968-71  and its trough in 
1977-83,  have been responsible for the productivity slowdown in the 1970s or 
have significant productivity growth implications for the future? 
To the extent that an  invention either reduces the cost of production or devel- 
ops entirely new products, it has an aspect of increasing returns to it. The same 
invention could produce the same proportional effect, in different size markets 
26. Stafford (1952) is a marvelous example of how easy it is to make wrong predictions about 
the future. See also the sharp and confused exchanges between Gilfillan, Schmookler, and Kunik 
in Technology and Culture (Gilfillan 1960). 332  Chapter 13 
or economies. The public good nature of most inventions and the “multiplica- 
tive” aspect of their impact do not require their number to grow just to sustain 
a positive rate of productivity growth. On the other hand, economies do not 
grow just by replication and expansion; they also get more complex, proliferate 
different products  and activities, and develop in different geographical  and 
economic environments. To that extent, the “reach” of any particular invention 
does not expand at the same rate as the growth of  the overall economy, but 
only at the rate of growth of its “own” market. Therefore, I would expect that 
the “required” number of inventions for a steady positive rate of  growth in 
productivity has also to grow, but at a rate that need not be as fast as that of 
the economy as a whole. 
The preceding paragraph deals with the fundamentally unobservable quan- 
tum of invention or an advance in knowledge. It is clear, from the previous 
discussion and the earlier references, that its relationship to observed patent 
numbers is unlikely to have stayed constant over time. The important question, 
however, is what does an observed decline in patent numbers imply about the 
underlying stream of inventions and their ultimate effect on productivity. If the 
decline occurs because of a rise in the real cost of patenting, or even a decline 
in the expected value of the marginal patent, this may still have very little effect 
on the aggregate contribution of values of the inventions associated with these 
patents. The evidence discussed in Section 13.5 shows that the vast majority 
of patents are worth very little and that the bulk of the private and social total 
product of the inventive system is based on a relatively small number of very 
valuable patents. If  the patent value were known to the inventor in advance 
then a rise in the cost of patenting or a decline in the return from inventing 
would only deter the marginal, low-value inventive activity, and would leave 
the total aggregate return effectively unchanged. Inventors are unlikely, how- 
ever, to know the value of their inventions in advance. At the other extreme, 
one could  assume that  all  of  the  estimated  dispersion in patent  values  is 
“within,” that all of it represents the uncertainty that faces each individual in- 
ventor. Then, a decline in patent numbers would imply a parallel decline in 
total inventive activity and  Inventors do, undoubtedly, face great un- 
certainty about the ultimate value of their inventions, as is emphasized and 
documented by Pakes (1986), but probably not as extensive as would be im- 
plied by the estimated cross-sectional dispersion in patent values. The truth, I 
believe, is somewhere in the middle, but closer to the first case, with some 
definite knowledge about the potential importance of the particular invention. 
In that case, and this is also what can be read into the numbers reported in 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986), a decline in patenting would be associated 
with an increase in the average “value” of a patent, and a much smaller impact, 
if any, on the aggregate social output of this activity. 
Even if there were a real decline in inventive output associated with the 
27. This is one way to read the evidence presented in Edwin Mansfield (1986) that major U.S. 
corporations have not reduced the fraction of their inventions that they patent. 333  Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey 
observed decline in patent numbers, it is unlikely that we could discern its 
effects in the conventional productivity numbers. There are at least three rea- 
sons for this. First, not all of productivity growth is due to invention and only 
some fraction of the latter arises from patented inventions. If  one takes 1.5 to 
2.0 percent as the approximate growth rate per year in total factor productivity, 
at least half of it is likely to be due to the growth in the quality of the labor 
force, economies of scale, and various reallocations of capital between assets 
and industries. Moreover, it is unlikely that patented inventions could account 
for more than half of  all the relevant advances in knowledge. This leaves us 
with at most a quarter of total productivity growth, and an unknown fraction 
of its fluctuations, to be attributed to patented invention. 
Second, the effects of  an invention on productivity appear with a long and 
variable lag and it is doubtful that the available data and current econometric 
techniques could identify them clearly. Moreover, the aggregation over many 
inventions and many lag structures is likely to smooth them out further, be- 
yond recognition. 
Third, the great variability in the magnitude and importance of the various 
inventions adds another source of variance here.28  Given the great skewness in 
the value distributions one cannot take much comfort from the relatively large 
samples, or rather, population numbers (a point already noticed in the past by 
Nordhaus 1969 and others). To the extent that one does observe correlations 
between patent numbers and contemporaneous productivity numbers, the cau- 
sality is most likely running the other way, from productivity as a measure of 
the economic environment to patents as a measure of inventive “effort” rather 
than from the impact of inventive “output” on subsequent productivity. 
Thus, the question of diminishing returns to R&D and the implicit forecast 
of a declining productivity growth rate remains unresolved. If the relationship 
of patent numbers to inventive output has been changing then they cannot be 
used to make a judgment about this. The other evidence on this topic is also 
equivocal. A priori, one would expect to hit diminishing returns in any nar- 
rowly defined field, at least until the field or the product area is redefined anew 
by some other major breakthrough. Kuznets used detailed patent data to make 
this point already in 1930 (pp. 54-58).  This also follows from the various theo- 
retical models of the R&D process such as Evenson and Kislev (1975, ch. 8) 
and  others.  On  the  other hand,  inventive effort moves from  one “fishing” 
ground to another, and new fishing grounds open up as the result of basic R&D 
and other sources of discovery. Hence, in the longer run there is less evidence 
of exhaustion of opportunities, and studies that have tried to look for declines 
in the rates of return to R&D have found very little evidence of such a decline 
(see Griliches 1986 and Sveikauskas 1988, among others). The same conflict 
28. See Griliches (1989, p. 316) for a “back of an envelope” calculation which concludes that if 
about one-third of the 10 percent decline in patent applications (between the late 1960s and 1970s) 
were to translate itself into a decline in real innovative output, it would take us over seven years, 
not counting any lags, to detect it with any statistical “confidence” even if  there were no other 
sources of variation in productivity. And in the meantime, the trend might have reversed itself. 334  Chapter 13 
appears in the various estimates of the “patent production function” discussed 
in Section 13.4. Time-series estimates, which presumably measure returns to 
movements primarily along already established trajectories, all tend to come 
out with relatively low  elasticities of  patents received with respect to R&D 
invested, on the order of 0.2 to 0.45. On the other hand, cross-sectional studies, 
which presumably better represent the optimal migration of  R&D resources 
across fields and the finding of  new niches, yield elasticity estimates much 
closer to unity. 
The assumption of  diminishing returns is already contained in most R&D- 
based models of  productivity and productivity growth. In such models, with 
the stock of knowledge capital proxied by a “stock” of accumulated past R&D 
expenditures, the estimated elasticities tend to be rather small, on the order of 
0.06 to 0.2 (e.g., Mansfield 1984 and Griliches 1986). This, by the way, is not 
all that different from the time-series-based patent R&D coefficients estimates 
in Section 13.9. If productivity is a measure of knowledge accretion and pa- 
tents are a proxy index for it, then there may be no paradox here, after all. This 
is what is also implied by Figure 13.10, which plots (on a common logarithmic 
scale) the index (level) of multifactor productivity in the private business sector 
of the U.S. economy (as computed by the BLS) together with a measure of the 
total “stock” of patent applications in the U.S. and the parallel concept of the 
stock of  total R&D expenditures (both based on a  15 percent depreciation 
rate). Note the remarkably parallel behavior of the productivity series and the 
total patent stock series and the faster growth rate, at least during the earlier 
part of the period, of  the total R&D stock series. The relationship would be 
poorer for the patent stock variable if only domestic patent applications were 
counted; it would have turned down significantly by the mid-1980s. This is a 
bit of evidence for my  view that the relevant indicator for measures of techni- 
cal change is total patents, not just domestic patents. 
In the past I looked at such charts and thought that something was wrong 
with the productivity numbers. But if  we  are to believe the patent numbers, 
perhaps they are not so wrong after all. For reasons discussed above, I do think 
that over longer periods of time patent numbers are an imperfect index of in- 
ventive output whose relationship to the underlying “frontier shift” has been 
declining over time. More will have to be learned, however, before we can feel 
certain about such inferences. Thus, the patent numbers leave us where we 
began, with a suggestive, but possibly misleading puzzle. 
13.12  Concluding Comments 
In this survey I have  described a number of  recent studies, many of  them 
spurred on by the growing availability of  machine readable data files and on- 
line data bases, whose common denominator is the use of  patent statistics to 
illuminate the process of innovation and technical change. A number of inter- 
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depreciation formula and estimated initial conditions. 
common in empirical work, quite a bit of frustration with our inability to really 
answer the "big"  questions. 
Among the major findings was the discovery of  a strong relationship be- 
tween patent numbers and R&D expenditures in the cross-sectional dimension, 
implying that patents are a good indicator of differences in inventive activity 
across different firms. While  the propensity to  patent differs  significantly 
across industries, the relationship between R&D and patents is close to propor- 
tional, especially for firms above a minimal size. Small firms do receive a sig- 
nificantly higher number of patents per R&D dollar but this can be explained 
by their being a much more highly selected group. There is also a statistically 
significant relationship between R&D and patents in  the within-firm time- 
series dimension, but it is weaker there. The bulk of the effect is contempora- 
neous, implying possibly also some reverse causality: successful research lead- 
ing to both patents and to the commitment of additional funds for the further 
development of the resulting ideas. 
The practical implication of these findings is that in the absence of detailed 
R&D data, the much more plentiful patent data can be used instead as an indi- 
cator of both inventive input and output. Care should be taken, however, not to 336  Chapter 13 
overinterpret small and even sizable differences in patent numbers, especially 
in the time dimension. Analyses of  survey responses by  patent owners, the 
modeling of  the renewal pattern of  patents in Europe, and attempts to relate 
market values and changes in the stock market rates of return all conclude with 
very high estimates of both the variance and skewness in the distribution of 
patent values. These findings, especially the large amount of skewness in this 
distribution, lead to rather pessimistic implications for the use of patent counts 
as indicators of short-run changes in the output of R&D. 
At  the aggregate level the interesting finding is that the appearance of an 
absolute decline in inventive activity was largely a statistical mirage, caused 
by a bureaucratic rather than an economic or technological cycle. The question 
about the causes of the relative decline in patenting relative to the growth in 
R&D expenditures cannot be answered conclusively, though I remain rather 
sanguine on this matter. There is good reason to think that the relationship 
between inventive output and the number of  patents has changed over time, 
that the yardstick shrank. Some evidence on this comes from patent renewals 
data pointing to a rising average “quality” of patents. Also, R&D numbers may 
be overestimating the real growth in inventive input. Moreover, it is not obvious 
that we need a growing number of  inventions to sustain our current rates of 
growth, or that we  should worry too much about the rising rate of  foreign 
inventions. We are likely to be their ultimate beneficiaries. 
In spite of all the difficulties, patent statistics remain a unique resource for 
the analysis of the process of technical change. Nothing else even comes close 
in the quantity of available data, accessibility, and the potential industrial, orga- 
nizational, and technological detail. Moreover, there are other ways of  using 
them besides simply counting them. It is possible to use a firm’s distribution 
of patenting by  field to infer its position in “technological space” and to use 
this information, in turn, to study how the results of R&D spill over from one 
firm to another, illuminating thereby also the process of strategic rivalry that 
the firm finds itself in. As U.S.  patent renewal information becomes available 
at the individual patent and firm level, one will be able to use it together with 
data on patent citations to construct more relevant “quality-weighted” inven- 
tive “output” measures. Even without going that far, the currently available 
patent data can be used to study longer-run interfirm differences in levels of 
inventive activity and as a substitute for R&D data where they are not available 
in the desired detail. We  should not be cursing the darkness, but rather, we 
should keep on lighting candles. 
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